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RECREATIONAL RIGHTS TO THE DRY SAND
BEACH IN FLORIDA:
PROPERTY, CUSTOM AND CONTROVERSY
Alyson Flournoy, Thomas T. Ankersen & Sasha Alvarenga 1

Abstract
At the close of the 2018 legislative session Florida Governor Rick Scott
signed HB 631 into law. The new law converted local dustups between
beachgoers and beachfront landowners into a statewide sandstorm that
pitted public rights to access to the dry sand beach against landowners’
private property rights. This article seeks to address the widespread
confusion about the scope of and relationship between these respective
rights and to rebut confused and exaggerated narratives about the
impacts of the new law that have fueled further conflict. The resolution
of these issues will have broad policy implications, with significant
impact on recreational, property, dignity, economic, and conservation
values. Moreover, in an era of ongoing sea-level rise, the pressures on
our coastal resources and the conflicts among these values will only
increase. The article begins by briefly describing the history of the
current controversy and of the legal principle at the heart of the conflict:
the doctrine of customary use of Florida’s beaches. After offering a
detailed review of the Florida Supreme Court’s landmark case on the
customary use doctrine along with subsequent lower court cases
interpreting it, it identifies the legal issues that have created widespread
confusion regarding the interplay among the common law property
rights at issue, local ordinances that recognize and regulate those rights,
and the recent state legislation now codified in Fla. Stat. §163.035
(2019). The article concludes by discussing some of the options
available to the Florida legislature to resolve the controversy that HB
631 engendered and to address related issues contributing to conflict at
the water’s edge along the state’s coastline.

1. Alyson C. Flournoy – Professor and Alumni Research Scholar, University of
Florida Levin College of Law; Thomas T. Ankersen, Legal Skills Professor &
Director, Conservation Clinic, University of Florida Levin College of Law,
Legal Specialist, Florida Sea Grant; Sasha Alvarenga, J.D. Candidate & Student
Associate, Conservation Clinic, University of Florida Levin College of Law.

2020]

Recreational Rights to the Dry Sand Beach

3

I. INTRODUCTION
At the close of the 2018 legislative session Florida Governor
Rick Scott signed HB 631 into law. Included in the bill, which
addressed a number of issues relating to actions for ejectment from
real property, was an amendment to the Florida Community
Planning Act entitled “Establishment of Recreational Customary
Use.” The new statute immediately created a sandstorm of
controversy as the media seized on what many in the public
perceived to be a land grab over the public’s right to recreate on
Florida’s sandy beaches. 2 As it turns out, the story is considerably
more nuanced, and neither the advocates on both sides nor the media
did the public any favors in the commentary and reporting on this
issue. However, both the background to the legislation and
subsequent events indicate that the public is rightly concerned about
efforts to limit recreational access, some of which have been spurred
or exacerbated by what had been a largely localized controversy.
This paper begins by briefly describing the history of the current
controversy, which had its origins in Walton County, Florida. The
conflict centers on arguments about the public’s right to use the dry
sand beach — that area of the beach that is between the line of
vegetation and the mean high tide line — which is often privately
owned. We then discuss the broader legal context that gives rise to
boundary disputes along dynamic shorelines and provide the
essential policy-relevant facts concerning public and private sandy
beach ownership. In order to fully understand the legal basis for the
public’s claim of right to use the sandy beaches and the legislative
response, we summarize the history of the relevant legal doctrine
2. Craig Pittman, New law Scott signed makes public access to beaches harder
to establish, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/New-law-Scott-signed-makespublic-access-to-beaches-harder-to-establish_167015546
[https://perma.cc/NR2U-BY3M].; Travis Cohen, Rick Scott Just Signed a Bill
That Could Make Many of Florida's Beaches Private, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Apr.
4, 2018), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/rick-scott-just-signed-a-billthat-could-make-many-of-floridas-beaches-private-10231813
[https://perma.cc/2YH7-NW6U].; John Kennedy, Beach lovers push back on
new property rights law, HERALD TRIBUNE (Apr. 14, 2018),
http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20180414/beach-lovers-push-back-on-newproperty-rights-law [https://perma.cc/KF6K-NQWB].
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known as customary use that came over from England during the
post-colonial era and made its way into the law of a number of states,
including Florida. We offer a detailed review of the Florida
Supreme Court’s landmark case on the customary use doctrine along
with subsequent lower court cases interpreting it. We then attempt
to identify the legal issues that have created widespread confusion
regarding the interplay among the common law property rights at
issue, local ordinances that recognize and regulate those rights, and
particularly, the state legislation that precipitated the widespread
attention to and conflict over this issue (em dash) HB 631, now
codified in Fla. Stat. §163.035 (2019). After flagging several legal
issues at the heart of the conflict, we provide an annotated summary
of the statute that describes the interpretive issues it raises or may
raise. We conclude by discussing some of the options available to
the Florida legislature to resolve the sandstorm of controversy that
HB 631 engendered.
A.

A Sandstorm of Controversy

HB 631 has its origins in Walton County, Florida, where
long simmering disputes between the beach-loving public and some
privacy-loving beachfront property owners erupted into litigation in
2016. The litigation was precipitated by the County’s efforts to
mediate the ongoing conflict by passing a “customary use”
ordinance. Landowners were seeking to enforce trespass laws
against public beachgoers continuing the longstanding practice of
using the landowners’ privately-owned beach. The County sought
to mediate through legislative action — adoption of an ordinance —
the conflict over the extent of the public’s right to use the dry sand
beach. At issue was the right of the public to venture onto and along
what is known as the “dry sand beach” — that part of the sandy
beach that is above mean high tide, and hence, if not publicly owned,
likely to be private property. Relying on an ancient legal doctrine
referred to as “customary use,” and a 1974 ruling by the Florida
Supreme Court recognizing that doctrine, 3 Walton County sought to
clarify and recognize the public’s right to reasonable use of the dry
sand beach within its jurisdiction, while including regulatory
3. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974).
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safeguards to protect beachfront property owners. The ordinance
reflected the County’s legislative determination, based on extensive
fact research and analysis of the relevant law, that the public had
customary use rights in the dry sand beach throughout Walton
County. At its core, customary use doctrine holds that where the
public has traditionally and continuously used the dry sand beach
since “time immemorial” it may continue to do so, even though the
property remains in private ownership. 4
Walton County’s 2017 ordinance sought to recognize and
protect, but also to regulate customary use rights, thereby providing
landowners some privacy and imposing what the County believed
to be reasonable limitations on the uses which the public could make
of the beach. The ordinance contained three key provisions. First, it
established a zone of fifteen feet “seaward from the toe of the dune
or from any permanent habitable structure owned by a private
entity” (whichever is more seaward) and prohibited the public at
large from using this buffer zone, except as needed to utilize an
authorized public beach access point. 5 This provision provided a
zone of privacy for private landowners who owned the dry sand
beach. Second, it prohibited interference with the right of the public
at large to engage in designated activities on the remainder of the
privately-owned dry sand beach. 6 Finally, it limited the nature and
scale of the activities the public could engage in on the dry sand
beach. The ordinance specifically prohibited use of tobacco,
possession of animals, and erection or use of tents.7 It explicitly
authorized the following exclusive list of activities: traversing the
beach; sitting on the sand, a beach chair, a towel or blanket; using a
beach umbrella seven feet or less in diameter; placement of surfing
or fishing equipment; sunbathing; picnicking; fishing; swimming or
surfing off the beach; and building sand creations.8

4. 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 935 at 623 (3d
ed. 1939).
5. WALTON COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-2(c) (2017).
6. Id. at § 23-2(a).
7. Id. at § 23-2(e).
8. Id. at § 23-2(d).
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As with any ordinance, Walton County followed its usual
notice and hearing process prior to adopting the customary use
ordinance. Various landowners who sought to challenge the
ordinance filed at least seven different lawsuits against Walton
County in 2016 and 2017, challenging the ordinance and a related
ordinance limiting signs and obstructions on the beach. The
plaintiffs variously claimed the ordinances were ultra vires, void for
vagueness, and a violation of their rights under the First, Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as imposing
unconstitutional conditions.9 The claims in the various lawsuits
filed after the ordinance’s passage encompassed both objections to
the substance of the ordinance (the validation of customary use
rights) and to the process (use of an ordinance to codify these rights).
Some Walton County landowners’ hostility to the ordinance fueled
legislative intervention that ended up producing HB 631.
All but one of the claims related to Walton County’s
ordinance10 were dismissed without prejudice as unripe or moot or
were voluntarily dismissed.11
9. Goodwin v. Walton Cnty. No. 3:16-cv-364/MCR/CJK (N.D. Fla. First
Amended Complaint filed Nov. 7, 2016)(1st Amendment and taking without just
compensation claims); Rosemary Beach v. Walton Cnty., No. 2016-CA-000594
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 14, 2016)(ultra vires and due process claims); A
Flock of Seagirls LLC v. Walton Cnty, No. 3-17-cv-0033-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla.
filed May 11, 2017)(taking without just compensation and taking without due
process claims); Seaside Town Council v. Walton Cnty., No. 3:17-cv-00682MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. Second Amended Complaint filed Oct. 2, 2017) (estoppel,
waiver, consent and acquiescence, substantive due process, procedural due
process, separation of powers, taking without just compensation, equal
protection, unconstitutional conditions, Fourth Amendment, and void for
vagueness claims).
10. This was a claim related to abandonment of an access easement in A Flock
of Seagirls LLC v. Walton Cty, No. 3-17-cv-0033-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. filed
May 11, 2017).
11. Most of these claims weres dismissed as moot or voluntarily after the
adoption of HB 631invalidated the Walton County ordinance. Rosemary Beach
v. Walton Cnty., No. 2016-CA-000594 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. March 28, 2018)
(Notice of voluntary dismissal); A Flock of Seagirls LLC v. Walton Cnty, No. 317-cv-0033-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. May 5, 2018); Stipulation for dismissal of
taking and due process claims); Seaside Town Council v. Walton Cnty. No.
3:17-cv-00682-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2018) (Order denying summary
judgment and dismissing all claims as moot). The as applied takings challenge
in Goodwin v. Walton County was dismissed as unripe. No. 3:16-cv-
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In the midst of the Walton County litigation, the Florida
legislature passed, and the Governor signed HB 631, effectively
preempting all but two counties with preexisting Customary Use
ordinances—Volusia and St. Johns—f rom adopting or maintaining
similar ordinances by any process other than a new process
described in the Bill. Although landowners seeking legislative
action may also have wanted to substantively curtail customary use
rights, the legislation that ultimately passed in 2018 did not affect
any substantive change in common law customary use rights, as is
explained in more detail below. One clear and intended impact of
the Bill was to invalidate the Walton County ordinance. This in turn
mooted the remaining claims in most of the pending litigation. The
sponsors of the Bill expressed the hope that this reset would
eliminate or at least reduce the level of conflict and litigation in
Walton County and elsewhere. 12 However, as is detailed below, the
new law certainly did not end and arguably intensified the conflict.
At least one bill was filed in the Senate for the 2019 legislative
session that would have repealed HB 631 but it did not advance. 13
A last-minute floor amendment to HB 631 injected
uncertainty into the preemptive intent of the statute: it allows local
governments to raise customary use as an affirmative defense in any
proceeding challenging an ordinance enacted prior to the new law’s
effective date of July 1, 2018. This arguably created a window after
the Bill’s signing by the Governor and before its effective date in
which any ordinances adopted by local governments would be
exempt from the new procedure because, when challenged, these
ordinances could nevertheless be defended based on customary
364/MCR/CJK (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2018)(Order dismissing 1st Amendment
claim as moot and as applied takings claim as unripe).
12. Shelby Danielsen, Debate Heats Up Over Public Beach Access Along
Private Property in Florida, FIRST COAST ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/local/beaches/debate-heats-upover-public-beach-access-along-private-property-in-florida/77-507298799
[https://perma.cc/2TYD-4274].
13. News Service of Fla., Beach Access Law Gets Challenged, Rouson Files
Repeal Bill, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018)
http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/11/21/beach-access-lawgets-challenged-rouson-files-repeal-bill/.
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use.14 However, the new law prohibited local governments from
“keeping in effect”—as well as adopting—ordinances finding,
determining, relying on or based upon customary use of the dry sand
beach, unless they are enacted pursuant to the new process. 15 This
inconsistency created uncertainty and an arguable basis for local
government action during the window before July 1, 2018. A
number of counties and municipalities took advantage of this
window to enact new ordinances. 16
B.

Underlying Currents of Conflict

There are several factors that have brought questions
concerning the scope of the public’s use rights to the fore and made
public use a contentious issue. Some of these are social, cultural,
and economic. But some of the undercurrents are legal.
First, many landowners don’t understand that their title to
beachfront land may be subject to customary use rights of the public.
Some mistakenly think that beach ownership necessarily means an
absolute right to exclude others. The right to exclude is an important
attribute of property ownership, often viewed as one of the most
important “sticks in the bundle” of property rights, 17 but it is not
absolute. Land ownership has always been subject to various
limitations, both regulatory and property-law based. As the late
Justice Scalia noted in his opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina
14. FLA. STAT. §163.035(4). F. S. JOUR. 689, 770 (Reg. Session 2018)
(amendment 1 to Fla. CS for HB 631 (2018)) [https://perma.cc/QVT2-87YE].
15. FLA. STAT. §163.035(2).
16. NAPLES, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 42, art. II, div. V (2018);
FERNANDINA BEACH, FLA. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 90, art. II, div. 3 (2018);
VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 20 art. III (2018); WALTON
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-2 (2018); Flagler County Board of
County Commissioners, Public Hearing on Consideration of an Ordinance
Recognizing the Right of Customary Use of the Beach by the Public (June 18,
2018); Indian Rocks Beach Special City Commission Meeting on Ordinance No.
2018-3 Customary Use of the Beach (June 28, 2018); Nassau County Board of
County Commissioners, Agenda on the Adoption of Ordinance on Customary
Use of Beach by the Public (June 25, 2018).
17. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see Thomas W.
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998),
available at https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol77/iss4/7
[https://perma.cc/X472-58PE].
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Coastal Commission, landowners' property rights are subject to socalled "background principles" of property law. 18
These
background principles typically derive from the common law as it
has evolved over time in the various states. And in the case of
privately-owned dry sand beach in Florida, customary use rights,
prescriptive easements, purpresture, and implied dedication, are
among the inherent limitations that comprise the background
principles that may create exceptions to the right to exclude.
Second, property at the ocean edge has other unique
challenges. For beachfront property, the seaward boundary is what
is called an ambulatory boundary—in other words, unlike a
traditional surveyed property line fixed on a map, the boundary can,
and does move.19 Beachfront owners may think that there is a fixed
line that determines where their property ends, but this is not always
the case. There is a line in the sand, but it’s one that can move in
either direction over time. This is because the mean high tide is
determined based on the average of 18.6 years of high tides. 20 So
locating the mean high tide line is not as easy as looking at where
the sand is wet on a given day, as many beachgoers, property
owners, and even some law enforcement officers assume. 21
Changes that occur to the land sea interface as a result of slow
changes over time (erosion & accretion) can cause the boundary
between public and private land to move and deviate from the mean
high tide line.22 As a result, it is all but impossible for one walking
the beach collecting sea shells to know for sure on which side of a
property line she is walking. Similarly, even for the landowner,
tracing the contours of this boundary is likely to present significant
challenges and may entail periodic modification. Erecting
structures, fences, signs or other traditional signals of ownership is
a fraught exercise on a high energy beach.
18. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
19. Alyson C. Flournoy, Beach Law Cleanup: How Sea-level Rise Has Eroded
the Ambulatory Boundaries Framework, 42 VT. L. REV. 89, 100–05 (2017).
20. Id. at 101.
21. See e.g., Tom McLaughlin, Duo test limits of beach access, governor’s
order, enforcement, WALTON SUN (Jul. 16, 2018),
http://www.waltonsun.com/news/20180716/duo-test-limits-of-beach-accessgovernors-order-enforcement [https://perma.cc/8HJF-DXST].
22. See Flournoy, supra note 18.
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So, landowners who attempt to demarcate their sandy beach
as private and off limits to the public, may be wrong on two counts
in any given case. First, even if that part of the beach is privately
owned, the public may have customary use rights. Second, if the
mean high tide line has migrated, what was once their property may
no longer be. And even to understand what areas of the dry sand
beach are private or public in the first place requires greater
understanding of the sand on the beach, where it came from, when,
and how.
II. SAND FACTS
The reach of HB 631 is limited to dry sand beach that is held
in private ownership, a significant fraction of Florida’s 825 miles of
sandy beach.23 However, there is already considerable publicly
owned dry sand beach, the result of federal, state, and local
government ownership for public use as coastal parks or other
protected areas, as well as for non-public or limited public use, such
as military and civil works installations. While the data is difficult
to come by, one “back of the envelope” estimate based on publicly
available geospatial data has put the amount of beach already in
public ownership as parks, protected areas, and other government
lands, at close to 50% of 825 miles of sandy beaches.24
Florida’s dry sand beaches may also become partially public
as a result of the operation of the state beach management program. 25
Of the approximately 825 miles of sandy beach, more than 229 miles
are scheduled to be nourished or re-nourished with new sand in order
23. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., STRATEGIC BEACH MANAGEMENT PLAN:
INTRODUCTION 1 (2018), https://floridadep.gov/sites/default/files/SBMPIntroduction_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJC5-HKWB].
24. The authors were unable to locate an official calculation or estimate of the
number of linear miles of privately-owned sandy beach in Florida. Determining
what property deeds along Florida’s entire coastline extend to the mean highwater line (MHWL) is a labor-intensive, fact specific determination. Kranz
generally cites to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection for the
proposition that sixty percent of Florida beaches are in public ownership. Erika
Kranz, Sand for the People: The Continuing Controversy Over Public Access to
Florida’s Beaches, 83 FLA. BAR J. 10, n. 8 (2009).
25. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 2323, at 14.
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to forestall erosion.26 To be eligible for nourishment these beaches
must first have been declared “critically eroded” by the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection. 27 The 2017 update to the
State’s Critical Erosion Report indicates that 420.9 miles of
Florida’s sandy beaches are critically eroded, and another 92.2 miles
are “eroded.”28 Hurricane Irma-induced erosion in 2017 meant that
for the first time more than 50% of Florida’s beaches were critically
eroded, and hence eligible for beach management. 29 The data from
Florida’s most recent storm, Hurricane Michael, has not been tallied.
Nourishment – the placement of additional sand on the beach
seaward of the mean high tide line – pushes back the tide and resets
the erosion clock. When a beach is nourished using federal or state
dollars, the newly emergent dry sand beach—created from the
submerged lands seaward of the mean high tide line and typically
owned by the State of Florida – remains in state ownership up to the
former mean high tide line, which is now a line in the dry sand, and
is re-designated the “erosion control line (ECL).” 30 The beach
landward of the ECL remains privately owned if it previously was
26. Id. at 15.
27.Id. “Critically eroded shoreline” is defined in subsection 62B-36.002(5),
F.A.C., as “a segment of the shoreline where natural processes or human activity
have caused, or contributed to, erosion and recession of the beach or dune
system to such a degree that upland development, recreational interests, wildlife
habitat or important cultural resources are threatened or lost. Critically eroded
shoreline may also include adjacent segments or gaps between identified critical
erosion areas which, although they may be stable or slightly erosional now, their
inclusion is necessary for continuity of management of the coastal system or for
the design integrity of adjacent beach management projects.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 62B-36.002(5) (2013).
28. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., CRITICALLY ERODED BEACHES IN FLORIDA 5
(Dec. 2017),
https://floridadep.gov/sites/default/files/CriticalErosionReport_0.pdf.
29. The Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines at Western Carolina
University maintains a state by state interactive website that tracks beach
nourishment projects. Office for Coastal Mgmt. Digital Coast, BEACH
NOURISHMENT VIEWER, http://beachnourishment.wcu.edu/ (“[T]he PSDS beach
nourishment database contains attribute information on the general location of
sand placement, primary funding source and funding type, volume of sediment
emplacement (in cubic yards), length of beach nourished (in feet) and cost and
inflated cost for 2,000 identified beach nourishment episodes dating back to
1923.”).
30. FLA. STAT. §§ 161.141, 161.151(3) (2018).
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so, while the new beach, which has been created through the
addition of sand, remains in public ownership. While the private
property owner retains riparian rights over the newly created public
beach,31 the public owns and has the right to use the newly emergent
dry sand beach. This bifurcation of dry sand beach ownership
remains until such time as the ocean or Gulf erodes the nourished
public beach back to the ECL (the former Mean High Tide Line). 32
Once that occurs, there is no longer a publicly owned dry sand
beach, and the common law boundary is reinstated.
To date, new publicly owned dry sand beach has been
created along more than 229 miles of Florida's coastline, under an
increasingly robust – and increasingly necessary—beach
management program. Indeed, beach nourishment is one of the
ways that funds can be spent under Florida’s constitutionally
enshrined land acquisition program. Federal cost-share represents a
significant percentage of the funding for beach nourishment. 33
Moreover, once a beach has been nourished, it is eligible to be
nourished at regular intervals.34 While some of these nourished
beach miles are already in public ownership as parks and protected
areas, most are not, simply because a key impetus for nourishment
– the protection of upland structures – does not obtain. As a result,
a conservative assessment would suggest that the dry sand beach on
more than half of Florida’s beaches may be completely or partially
open to public use based on public ownership or ongoing
nourishment.35 Of course, being open to public use does not
31. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.
702, 710 (2010).
32. FLA. STAT. §161.211(2) (2018).
33.“There are 25 federally authorized projects addressing 134.4 miles of
shoreline. Florida has the largest federal shore protection program in the nation.
Total Florida federal obligations to date for FY 1980-2016 are $1,155,000,000.
The federal funding obligation for Florida shore protection projects is projected
to be $1.3 billion over the next 20-year period (total cost $2.2B, remainder nonfederal share).” Beaches 2017 & Beyond, A Funding Initiative for Statewide
Beach Management, FLA. SHORE & BEACH PRESERVATION ASS’N (Oct. 3,
2016), https://www.fsbpa.com/Beaches2017.pdf, [https://perma.cc/8D3MG9WN]
34. Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) 33 U.S.C. § 2213(d)(2) (2007);
33 C.F.R. § 263.26(b) (2018).
35. See supra note 23 & acc. text.
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necessarily mean that it is easily accessible. For example, many
areas lack facilities for parking or easy public transit access, thus, as
a practical matter, limiting the use to those who live or are staying
in the immediate vicinity.
Additionally, it is important to note that, even in the face of
ongoing sea level rise, not all of Florida’s beaches are eroding. All
coastal dynamics are local and there are beaches that are stable or
accreting. Beyond any natural accretion that may occur due to
geomorphological variation, sand accretes behind structures,
especially inlet jetties; and sand from nourished beaches inevitably
drifts beyond the project footprint, adding sand to unnourished
beaches.36 These processes do not directly affect the underlying
substantive property relationships, and the growing dry sand beach
may all become privately owned, though it may still be subject to
the use rights that are the subject of this paper.
III. CUSTOMARY USE DOCTRINE
A.

Origins and Theory

The notion of custom as a normative source of law extends
across legal systems and is also recognized in international law. 37 In
the context of American property law, scholars and courts trace
customary use to the English common law, dating back to medieval
times when courts and communities found the law through social
norms that emerged over time. 38 Customary use is often lumped
with other common law property doctrines that seek to order the
relations between bona fide owners of particularized property and
others who have made use of that property to such an extent that
new property relations develop between them. In essence, one or
more of the “bundle of sticks” that constitute the right to property
36. Jim Houston & Bob Dean, Erosional Impacts of Modified Inlets on the East
Coast of Florida (Beach Encroachment and Nourishment),
https://www.fsbpa.com/2016TechPresentations/Houston.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/58GD-LUEV].
37. See ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 47–50 (1971).
38. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
307–09 (5th ed. 1956).
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has been either transferred or diminished. In this taxonomy, that
stick is most commonly the right to exclude others. 39
Most well-known among these doctrines are adverse
possession and prescription, followed by implied dedication and
custom. All have been imported into U.S. jurisprudence from
English common law and modified to varying extents upon arrival.
Adverse possession recognizes that one can occupy another’s
property for so long and under such conditions that it makes no sense
to retain the absent owner’s actual ownership. In such cases, a new
title can arise in the non-owning user, and the original owner is
divested. A variation on this accounts for those circumstances
where a trespassory use is made of private property by a user, or
users other than the owner, to such an extent that the owner’s right
to exclude must give way to the trespasser. This is referred to as the
creation of a “prescriptive easement,” and is most often associated
with footpaths and roadways. As with adverse possession, once the
easement is perfected a new interest in the property arises and the
owner’s rights are diminished.
Both adverse possession and easement by prescription have
been recognized by the courts and/or codified in the law of many
states with distinct requirements that must be proved.40 Key among
these is the requirement that the use must be ‘adverse’ to the
property owner. This element is often missing in cases where
owners have invited, tolerated, or just ignored use of their property
by others, without their permission. However, where adversity is
absent, a user may still gain rights under the doctrines of implied
dedication and custom. 41 Implied dedication occurs where a
landowner demonstrates an intent to surrender his or her land for use

39. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 730 (1998).
40. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (2018) (codifying and modifying the common
law doctrine of adverse possession). The leading case on adverse possession and
prescription in Florida continues to be Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57 (1958).
41. Sheryl Strauss & Emily Wallace-Jackson, Property Law—Common Law
Dedication: A Landowner's Intent to Dedicate—Security Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. C & C Investments, Inc., 448 N.W.2d 83 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989), 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 373, 373 (1991).
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by the public, and the public demonstrates acceptance of that use. 42
Custom, the subject of this discussion concerning sandy beaches,
entails its own unique requirements discussed further below.
Courts applying the common law have found that the
customary use doctrine is well-suited to circumstances where
adversity could not be easily proved, the geographic reach extends
beyond an individual parcel and the use is made by an “unorganized
public,” and have found no circumstance more appropriate than in
the use of the sandy beach. In the case of customary use, neither
title nor an easement arises in another interest holder. Instead, a
right of use is conferred, a right which is limited to the custom being
observed. There are a number of early cases where custom has been
applied to resolve disputes over otherwise trespassory communal
uses of private property. However, beachfront property appears to
be the only instance where the doctrine has recently been applied in
the United States.
1.

Customary Use in England

The notion of customary use of property arose in feudal
English land law as a means to recognize longstanding use of the
property of another (often the feudal lord who held domain over a
manor comprised of vast tracts of land) by a community of persons
(often the subjects of the manor who lived and worked on the land)
who were accustomed to conducting their use for specific purposes
since “time immemorial,” which was also described as “until the
memory of man runneth not,” or “time out of mind.”43 In England

42. Hollywood, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 65, 71 (1975) (finding an
implied dedication of the dry sand beach).
43. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67
(1765).
A good discussion of the English origins of the law of customary use can be
found in: David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach
Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996); see also Hope M.
Babcock, Has The U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained The Swamp Of Takings
Jurisprudence?: The Impact Of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council On
Wetlands And Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1995); Carol
Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
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this apparently required continuity of use back at least to the times
preceding the Coronation of Richard I on September 3, 1189 – a
concept referred to as “legal memory.” However, even in England
more practical approaches were the norm. One scholar of the history
of the common law asserts that the length of time for custom to ripen
into law was and should be substantially shorter. 44
English law also suggests that custom was meant to be
applied to geographically distinct areas such as counties, cities,
towns, and manors, and not to the whole of England, and for the
benefit of a community of people rather than individuals.45 Most
early English custom cases addressed the customary use of property
for productive, but non-extractive, purposes such as water access,
storing seaweed, net-drying, etc. However, over time, these sorts of
utilitarian uses faded, and the doctrine began to be asserted to
support more contemporary routinized community rituals such as
playing cricket and dancing around the maypole, foreshadowing the
recreational use to which it is now almost exclusively applied in the
United States.

44. Id. “In modern times we hear a lot too much of the phrase ‘immemorial
custom.’ In so far as this phrase implies that custom is or ought to be
immemorially old it is historically inaccurate. In an age when custom was an
active living factor in the development of society, there was much less insistence
on actual or fictitious antiquity.” PLUCKNETT, supra note 32 at 342–43.
45. According to Blackstone:
And, first, the distinction between custom and prescription is this: that custom is
properly a local usage, and not annexed to any person; such as a custom in the
manor of Dale that lands shall descend to the youngest son; prescription is
merely a personal usage; as, that Sempronius, and his ancestors, or those whose
estate he hath, have used time out of mind to have such an advantage or
privilege. As for example; if there be a usage in the parish of Dale, that all the
inhabitants of that parish may dance on a certain close at all times, for their
recreation (which is held to be a lawful usage); this is strictly a custom, for it is
applied to the place in general, and not to any particular persons; but if the
tenant, who is seised of the manor of Dale in fee, alleges that he and his
ancestors, or all those whose estate he hath in the said manor, have used time out
of mind to have common of pasture in such a close, this is properly called a
prescription; for this is a usage annexed to the person of the owner of this estate.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 263–64
(1893).
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Relying on English commentator William Blackstone, who
has enjoyed tremendous, if sometimes criticized, influence as a
chronicler of the common law in the United States, American
commentators have broken down the proof required for customary
use into a series of discrete elements, some of which courts have
lumped together, due to their potential redundancy or overlap. The
general formulation of the doctrine that has emerged is that the right
to use by custom cannot be acquired unless it is proved that the use:
1) has continued from time immemorial 2) without interruption 3)
and as of right; 4) is certain as to the place 5) and as to the persons;
and 6) is certain and reasonable as to the subject matter or rights
created.46
2.

Customary Use in the United States

The customary use doctrine clearly made its way across the
Atlantic and into the common law of the states of the United States,
albeit unevenly. Early recognition can be found in Maine,47
Massachusetts,48 and New Hampshire; 49 however, Maine has
subsequently given conflicting signals regarding the doctrine’s
viability.50 Rejection can be found in Connecticut (1905),51 New

46. 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 935 at 623 (3d
ed. 1939); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 75–78 (1893) (explaining the elements of custom).
47. Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83 (Me. 1861) (noting customary use rights as a
potential basis for a claim for an easement but not available in circumstances
like those presented which involved collection of a profit⎯seaweed).
48. Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. 504 (Mass. 1829).
49. Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524 (N.H. 1845) (recognizing a right of passage, but
denying defendants’ claim which was based on a customary right to collect a
profit -- seaweed); Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387 (N.H. 1851). (recognizing a
customary right to deposit seaweed collected from the ocean on private land).
50. Compare Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2014 ME 12, 34 (1984)
(expressly rejecting doctrine of custom and noting that Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine had never recognized an easement by custom as a viable cause of
action), with Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (appearing to
recognize the existence of custom as a possible claim but upholding lower
court’s finding of lack of evidence to support Town’s claim). In addition, the
legislature seems to recognize the possibility that claims based on custom exist
in ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 812 and 812A (2018).
51. Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130 (Conn. 1905).
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York (1935),52 and New Jersey (1825).53 The rationale for rejection
generally centered on the irrelevance of a feudal doctrine to a
modern nation, the impossibility of envisioning a “time
immemorial” in a young country such as the U.S., and concern over
the introduction of uncertainty into a relatively well-formed system
of land titling and registration. 54 A non-coastal outlier, Idaho,
confirmed the doctrine’s existence in that state in 1979, but refused
to apply it.55 Finally, there are the states (or territories) where the
doctrine has been recognized explicitly in the context of the
contemporary dilemma of public recreational beach access: Oregon
(1969),56 Florida (1974),57 Hawaii,58 North Carolina,59 Texas,60 and
the U.S. Virgin Islands.61 These are discussed more fully below.
Thus, if one were keeping count, the score would appear to
be at least ten jurisdictions that have embraced or at least recognized
customary use as an aspect of their common law, and at least three
that have rejected it. 62 Interestingly, nearly all these cases involved
disputes centering on access to and along water bodies.

52. Gillies v. Oriental Beach Club, 159 Misc. 675 (N.Y. 1935).
53. Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N.J.L. 125 (N.J. 1825); Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 323 (N.J. 1984).
54. See RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.11[6].
55. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093 (Idaho 1979).
56. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969); Stevens v. City
of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 454–55 (Or. 1993).
57. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
58. Public Access Shoreline v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246,
1255–56 (Haw. 1995); Laura C. Harris, Case Note, Public Access Shoreline
Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Commission: Expanding Hawaii's Doctrine
Of Custom, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 293 (1997).
59. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015); appeal
dismissed 793 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. 2016); cert. denied 138 S.Ct. 75 (2017).
60. Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
61. United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 772–73
(D.V.I. 1974).
62. We limited our research to coastal states and did not exhaustively survey the
law of inland states to determine whether the doctrine had been addressed in
those states, for example in the riverine context. None of the secondary
literature on customary use that we consulted referenced states other than those
described above. As is noted infra, note 62, some of the states that have declined
to adopt customary use have instead relied on other doctrines like the public
trust to achieve a similar outcome.
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The Modern Customary Use Cases and Recreational Beach
Access

As noted above, five states and the Territory of the Virgin
Islands have explicitly recognized customary use as the basis for
resolving recreational beach access conflicts: Oregon, Hawaii,
North Carolina, Texas, and Florida. Others, like New Jersey and
California, have eschewed or ignored customary use in favor of
other doctrinal approaches, such as the expansion of the public trust
doctrine beyond the mean high water line, and implied dedication.63
The leading and most expansive customary use case is State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hayes, decided in 1969 by the Supreme Court of
Oregon.64 In that case, the Court effectively threw all of the dry sand
beaches of Oregon open to the public on the theory that all of the
beaches of the State had been used since time immemorial, referring
back to the use of the beach by Native Americans. Thornton has
been criticized for its lack of fealty to the common law roots of
customary use, which suggest that the use should be considered in
geographically specific contexts.65 Thornton was followed by
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach. In that case, the Court found that
customary use was a “background principle” of Oregon property
law such that its application did not support a takings challenge, and
that Oregon statutory law simply recognized and applied the
doctrine for regulatory and local government planning purposes.66
The United States Supreme Court refused to consider the case, but
the denial of certiorari was accompanied by a written dissent from
Justice Scalia that should serve as a cautionary tale for those
interpreting and applying the doctrine under state law.67
Hawaii is unique due to the strong influence of indigenous
(Native Hawaiian) customary law on its common law. While the
Hawaii Supreme Court looked to the theories that underlie the
63. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
64. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
65. David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1418–26 (1996).
66. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 454–55 (Or. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
67. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
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importation of customary use from England, these seemed more
designed to bolster the conclusion that traditional Hawaiians’
entitlement to use rights stemmed from the State’s recognition of the
primacy of indigenous customary law. 68
In 1998, North Carolina amended a statute, which defined
the seaward boundary of property within the state as the mean high
water mark, to add language recognizing the right of the public to
use the full extent of the dry sand beaches throughout the state. 69 The
statute references both the “frequent, uninterrupted, and
unobstructed” use of the full extent of the dry sand beach “from time
immemorial” and the right of the people to “customary free use”
under the common law and as part of the common heritage
recognized in the state Constitution. 70 This same section also
describes these rights as “public trust rights.” 71 A 2015 decision by
North Carolina’s intermediate appellate court confirmed that this
statute and other provisions of state law recognized and codified
public trust rights in privately-owned land.72 The court noted that its
opinion was the first appellate opinion to confirm the existence of
these rights, and noted that it was unclear whether custom and public
trust rights are separate doctrines in North Carolina, or whether
custom has been used to determine where and how public trust rights
arise.73 The court rejected the takings claim raised by landowner
plaintiffs to an ordinance adopted by the Town of Emerald Isle
authorizing driving on the dry sand beach, in part because the right
to prevent the public from enjoying the dry sand portion of the

68. Public Access Shoreline v. Hawai’i Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246
(Haw. 1995).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. §77-20(d)–(e) (2018).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. §77-20(d) (2018).
71. Id.
72. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 194 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
The other state statutes the court cited that recognize and codify customary free
use of the beaches are N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (2018) (defining and protecting
from adverse possession public trust use rights) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A134.1(b) (2018) (legislative finding that beaches and coastal waters have been
customarily freely used throughout the State).
73. Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 196.
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property was never part of the “bundle of rights” purchased by
plaintiffs.74
Texas was the early adopter when it comes to explicitly
recognizing the customary use doctrine for recreational beach
access. In 1959, Texas passed the “Open Beaches Act,” which
provides for recreational dry sand rights “if the public has acquired
a right of use or easement to or over an area by prescription,
dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of continuous right in
the public ….”75 While the application of the beach access law has
had a number of twists and turns in Texas, the Open Beaches Act
has consistently been interpreted by Texas courts as a recognition
of common law custom (as well as dedication and prescription), and
not as the creation or expansion of new rights.76
The U.S. Virgin Islands arguably went further than Texas,
by enacting legislation that made explicit legislative findings of
customary use, as well as preserving and regulating customary use
on the Island’s beaches.77 The Open Shorelines Act provides: “The
Legislature recognizes that the public has made frequent,
uninterrupted and unobstructed use of the shorelines of the Virgin
Islands throughout Danish rule and under American rule as recently
as the nineteen fifties. It is the intent of the Legislature to preserve
what has been a tradition and to protect what has become a right of
the public.”78 It further declares and affirms that “the public,
individually and collectively, has and shall continue to have the right
to use and enjoy the shorelines of the United States Virgin Islands,”
and defines the shorelines as the area from the low tide line fifty feet
landward or to the vegetation line or a natural barrier, whichever is
the shortest distance. 79 In 1979, the Federal District Court with
jurisdiction in the Territory affirmed the validity of the statute under
the United States Constitution and, citing Blackstone, reaffirmed the
74. Id. at 197 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992).
75. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.014 (West 2017) (emphasis added).
76. Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W. 2d 95 (Tex. 1986); Arrington v. Mattox, 767
S.W. 2d 957 (Tex. 1989); Brannan v. State, 365 S.W. 3d 1 (Tex. 2010).
77. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 401 (2017).
78. Id.
79. Id. at § 402.
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customary use doctrine as a recognized principle of property law in
the Virgin Islands.80
Of the four states and one territory that have explicitly
recognized customary use as a fundamental attribute of the law of
property in their jurisdiction, only Florida had not recognized the
doctrine in statute—until it passed the statute at hand. As a matter
of the common law, Florida recognized the customary use doctrine
in the Tona-Rama case, discussed in detail below.
B.

The Tona-Rama Case: Customary Use Rights in Florida

The first case in Florida to recognize the doctrine of
customary use rights, City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama,81
involved a conflict between the owner of an observation tower in
Daytona Beach (Tona-Rama) and the owner of the Main Street Pier
(McMillan and Wright) which sought to construct a competing
observation tower that would cover approximately 230 square feet
of dry sand beach directly adjacent to the pier. This area was a small
portion of roughly 15,300 square feet of dry sand beach McMillan
and Wright owned and on which it paid taxes.
McMillan and Wright had obtained a permit and begun
construction when Tona-Rama sued. Tona-Rama claimed, in part,
that the observation tower would interfere with prescriptive rights
obtained by the public, under the theory that the use by the public
was adverse, continuous for more than 20 years, and open and
notorious. As is noted above, the elements for proving prescription
are similar to those required under the doctrine of adverse
possession; however, a claimant under prescription only asserts and
only acquires use rights rather than ownership rights. Tona-Rama
failed to secure a preliminary injunction, and so by the time the case

80. United States. v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts,
Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769 (V.I. 1974); see also Aliya T. Felix, Note, “Take Back the
Beach!” An Analysis of the Need for Enforcement of Beach Access Rights for
Virgin Islanders, 10 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 419 (2015); Jesse Reiblich &
Thomas T. Ankersen, Got Guts? The Iconic Streams of the U.S. Virgin Islands
and the Law’s Ephemeral Edge, 32 J. ENVTL L. & LITIG. 71, 102-04 (2017).
81. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
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reached the Florida Supreme Court, McMillan and Wright’s
observation tower had been constructed at a cost of over $125,000.
The Florida Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Adkins joined by three other Justices, concluded that there was no
prescriptive easement in the public because the public’s use could
not be deemed adverse to or inconsistent with the owner’s use and
enjoyment of the land.82 It found that the public’s use of the dry
sand around the pier was in no way inimical to the landowner’s
interests, and that the public was “the lifeblood of the pier” and had
“been welcomed to utilize the otherwise unused sands.”83
However, the Court went on to consider whether there were
other rights that the public had to the beaches of Florida and
concluded that such rights should and do exist in Florida pursuant to
the doctrine of customary use. It held:
[i]f the recreational use of the sandy area adjacent to mean
high tide has been ancient, reasonable, without interruption
and free from dispute, such use, as a matter of custom,
should not be interfered with by the owner. However, the
owner may make any use of his property which is consistent
with such public use and not calculated to interfere with the
exercise of the right of the public to enjoy the dry sand areas
as a recreational adjunct of the wet sand or foreshore area. 84
In its opinion, the Court made clear that the customary use
right was not an interest in the land, but merely a right of use. The
Court noted that the right of use cannot be revoked by the
landowner, but is subject to appropriate governmental regulation,
and that it may be abandoned by the public.
After this strong and unequivocal embrace of customary use
rights, in a single sentence the Court concluded that construction of
the tower was nonetheless consistent with the general recreational
use by the public and therefore the tower could remain. There is little
82. Id. at 77.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 78.
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elaboration on this key point in the opinion. 85 Clearly, as to the 230
square feet covered by the tower, traditional beach recreation was
completely precluded, which raises the question of why the Court
found the tower to be consistent with customary recreational use.
One possible explanation for this conclusion that the tower
was consistent with general recreational use is that when compared
with the broad expanse of dry sand beach still available to the public,
the small footprint of the tower was not significant enough to
constitute an inconsistent use or interference by the landowner with
the public’s rights on that tract of land. This reasoning would
support the Court’s conclusion that the tower was a reasonable use
by the landowner and did not interfere with the public’s use, even
though it physically blocked any use of the 230 square feet beneath
the tower. While not explicitly adopted by the Court, this type of
proportionality analysis would seem consistent with the outcome.
This explanation for the ruling also aligns with concerns expressed
in both the majority and dissenting opinions – that the landowner
paid taxes on the dry sand beach and that the public had use of most
of the vast swath of dry sand owned by McMillan and Wright. With
the tower, the owners only occupied a small proportion of the dry
sand beach they owned (roughly 1.5% of the area).
Three Justices dissented from the majority’s decision, all
three of whom believed that the public’s use in the case should be
considered adverse to the landowner’s and therefore that
prescription had been established. The three also concluded that the
tower interfered with the public’s rights.86 Two of the dissenters also
explicitly agreed with the finding of customary use. Nonetheless,
two of the three dissenters expressed concern for the equities of
requiring removal of the tower, with one of them only dissenting in
part, therefore concurring with the outcome (allowing the tower to
stand) but dissenting from the rationale; the other agreed with the
rationale but proposed a different remedy--- allowing the owner to
recoup its investment and only then requiring removal of the tower.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 79-82.

2020]

Recreational Rights to the Dry Sand Beach

25

This decision was later noted in two cases decided by
Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal, the lower court whose
decision was appealed in the Tona-Rama case. In Reynolds v. Cnty
of Volusia, the court declined to apply the doctrine of customary use
but in dictum wrote that the customary use doctrine “requires the
courts to ascertain in each case the degree of customary and ancient
use the beach has been subjected to and, in addition, to balance
whether the proposed use of the land by the fee owners will interfere
with such use enjoyed by the public in the past.” 87
In Trepanier v. Cnty of Volusia, landowners challenged the
public’s use of their property for driving and parking, while
conceding that the public had customary use rights for bathing,
swimming, and general recreation. 88 In rejecting the trial judge’s
conclusion that customary use for driving and parking existed, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal emphasized the lack of reference in
the lower court’s findings to any proof that the specific lots of the
plaintiffs’ had been used by cars, as opposed to use of the sand beach
in the general area for driving and parking. 89
The Court in Trepanier acknowledged that it was unclear
whether, in Tona-Rama, the Supreme Court had considered the right
of customary use only for the area of beach at issue in that case, or
whether it had considered the dry sandy beach in the general vicinity
of Daytona Beach or something else.90 However, it expressed its
view that the Supreme Court had not intended “to announce a right
by custom for public use of the entire sandy beach area of the entire
state of Florida.”91 Based on this understanding, the court went on to
offer guidance on the proof needed to support a finding of customary
use.
The Court noted that it “read Tona-Rama to require proof
that the general area of the beach where Appellants' property is
87. Reynolds v. Cnty. of Volusia, 659 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.1995).
88. Trepanier v. Cnty. of Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 2007).
89. Id. at 290.
90. Id. at 287.
91. Id. at 288.
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located has customarily been put to such use and that the extent of
such customary use on private property is consistent with the
public's claim of right.”92
The Court also questioned a conclusion by the trial judge that
the public’s use rights could migrate as the tide line migrates. The
trial judge had noted:
The easterly lot lines erode as the sovereign land
shifts landward and, in between the moving
boundary of the sovereign tideland (or foreshore) and
the plaintiffs' lots, the public right also shifts with the
tide….The area of public use cannot be bounded with
reference to a static line since the beach, and hence
the public's use of it, fluctuates landward and
seaward over time. The public right, if it is to reflect
the reality of the public's actual use of the beach,
must migrate. The law cannot freeze such a right at
one place any more than the law can freeze the beach
itself. 93
However, the Court did not rule on this legal question.
Analyzing the factual record in the case, the Court ultimately
concluded that migration of the public’s customary use of the beach
is a matter of proof and that genuine issues of material fact
remained.94 However, the Court expressed substantial uncertainty
regarding whether customary use should migrate under Florida
law.95
C.

A Note on Special Injury

To fully understand the dynamics of private and public rights
in this context, it is important to mention a rule established by the
Florida Supreme Court that affects who has standing to sue which
places members of the beachgoing public at a disadvantage in
92. Id. at 290.
93. Id. at 282–83.
94. Id. at 293
95. Id.
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gaining access to the courts to assert customary use rights. The
special injury rule, as it is known, was established by the Florida
Supreme Court in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Joachin.96 In order to
establish standing, the rule requires a party to allege an injury that is
different in degree and kind from the injury suffered by the
community at large. This rule has been held to apply in suits to
enjoin a public nuisance based on purpresture, and for blocking
public rights to the beach acquired through prescriptive easement,
implied dedication, and/or custom. 97
This rule therefore acts as a significant obstacle for members
of the beach-going public who might wish to assert customary use
when this right is shared with a large segment of the public, as it
may be in many cases. This was not an obstacle in Daytona Beach
v. Tona-Rama because the plaintiff in that case had an economic
interest—as the operator of a competing observation tower. Thus,
Tona-Rama was able to assert the rights to use the dry sand beach
that it shared with the public. The special injury rule is particularly
burdensome for plaintiffs seeking access to a beach because, in most
situations, everyone in the community would be denied the same
access and therefore almost no one would have an injury different
in degree and kind from the injury suffered by the community at
large. In fact, the rule creates a paradox—the more the community
is harmed by a lack of access to the beach, the less likely a plaintiff
is to be able to establish standing. This paradox has been noted in
legal scholarship on this topic, 98 and some have suggested that the
state legislature should address the situation.
IV. SOURCES OF CONFUSION AND CONFLICT
Incomplete or flawed understanding of three basic issues has
fueled the conflict surrounding beach access in parts of Florida
today. These are: (1) the status of common law customary use rights
in the absence of a judicial determination of those rights, (2) the
96. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Joachin, 200 So. 238, 239 (Fla. 1941).
97. United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9, 11-13 (Fla.
1974)
98. Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of
the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOL. L. Q. 755, 761 (2001).

28

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

status of a local ordinance recognizing customary use rights in the
absence of a judicial determination under the common law, and (3)
the impact of HB 631 on the public’s common law customary use
rights and on beachfront landowner’s property rights.
Misunderstanding of these three topics has led to significant
confusion over the effect of HB 631 and the relative public and
private rights to the dry sand beach in the absence of a local
ordinance.
A.

Common Law Rights and the Judicial Process

As discussed above, both private rights to property generally
and the public’s right to use the privately-owned dry sand beach
under the customary use doctrine are rights that have their roots in
the common law. A landowner who claims fee simple title to a
parcel of beachfront property that extends to the water claims that
title under long-established background principles of the common
law of property. Some of that common law has been codified and
modified by statutes. Where a statute has validly modified the
common law, it supersedes the common law. If no statutory
provision has modified the underlying common law, the common
law rights exist under the terms embodied in the common law. In
either case, under background common law property principles and
relevant statutory law, a landowner may have good title and a
member of the public may have customary use rights, whether or
not these rights have been challenged and established in court. This
is a critical point at issue in the contest between private and public
rights. A central argument articulated by some defending the new
requirements imposed by HB 631 is that the new law was necessary
to curb an incursion by local governments’ legislative branches into
the prerogatives of the judiciary. They argue that it is improper for
a local government’s legislative body to adopt an ordinance
recognizing and regulating customary use rights before the judiciary
has determined that these rights exist. But if this theory is correct, it
could also be argued that county ordinances that seek to prohibit
nuisances are similarly inappropriate. Like customary use, the
existence of a nuisance is a determination under common law that
can be made by a court.
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Moreover, this argument reflects a basic misunderstanding
about the nature of rights in the absence of a judicial determination.
Were it correct that rights recognized at common law do not exist in
advance of a judicial determination, this broader principle also could
affect recognition of landowners’ property rights to the dry sand
beach.
Of course, landowners’ property rights differ from
customary use rights because they are property—not merely use—
rights and are grounded not just in common law but in a deed that
grants title. This is indeed a significant distinction. However, the
broader point is that just like customary use rights, many aspects of
landowners’ rights, including, for example, the location of the
oceanward boundary of their property, are heavily dependent on
determinations requiring application of ancient, archaic, and
complex common law to their particular parcel – determinations that
are within the purview of the judiciary. For example, determining
property boundaries at the water’s edge under the law of accretion,
erosion, avulsion, and reliction is notoriously complex and highly
fact-dependent. However, a judicial determination quieting title in
the owner or determining the property’s boundaries has never been
a prerequisite to the landowner having or asserting valid ownership
rights within the boundaries the landowner believes to be valid. The
courts provide a mechanism for dispute resolution when conflicts
arise, but there is no precondition that all rights must be judicially
declared before they can exist. 99
The same is true for a person claiming rights under a
contract. Those rights exist and can be asserted without a prior
judicial determination that they exist. If someone wishes to
challenge those asserted contractual rights, they can do so through
litigation, which can result in a determination that the rights either
do or do not exist as claimed. If the court rules in favor of the party
claiming rights, the court generally is determining not whether to
create those rights, but whether those rights existed before litigation
was filed and before the court ruled that they were valid. Courts
99. This is consistent with the understanding of the essential role of the judicial
branch that underlies the rationale Judge Rodgers adopted in the ruling in the
Alford case, discussed infra.
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resolve disputes regarding parties’ relative rights, but there is no rule
requiring a judicial determination in order for the rights to be valid
or to come into existence. Similarly, actions may constitute a
nuisance and if they do, the nuisance exists before any judicial
determination in a suit seeking a remedy. Indeed, an award of
damages for past conduct inherently acknowledges the fact that the
nuisance existed before the judicial determination that recognizes it.
While customary use rights differ in that they arise from use
rather than a contract or deed or action constituting a nuisance, the
use, like the contract or the deed or the action constituting a
nuisance, is a preexisting fact with legal consequences. The rights
arising from the use may exist without regard to whether a court has
yet determined that they exist. In other words, the public may
already have common law customary use rights on any given stretch
of privately-owned beach in the state of Florida—whether or not
those rights have been either codified or judicially determined. 100
Yet property owners and others have shown confusion on this basic
point. Understanding that the public’s asserted rights may precede
a judicial determination of their existence – as do the rights of a
landowner or a party to a contract—is an important starting point for
analyzing the relative rights of beachgoers and landowners.
Many of the more extravagant claims being made by
landowners in coastal areas currently center on the idea that they
have the right to exclude the public and that their claim to ownership
trumps even valid customary use rights that the public may already
have.101 This is mistaken. Landowners may wish to challenge the
public’s customary use rights and can do so. Were a conflict to reach
court, whether by virtue of a plaintiff beach user bringing a suit to
100. Even scholars who favor a very limited approach to judicial adoption of
customary use acknowledge this. See Bederman, supra note 37, at 1450 n. 453
(acknowledging that customary rights predate judicial determination).
101. Annie Blanks, Customary use battle reaches boiling point in Walton
County, NWF DAILY NEWS (July 14, 2018),
http://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20180714/customary-use-battle-reachesboiling-point-in-walton-county [https://perma.cc/8ZY8-HRQY]; Ryan Nicol,
Banning the beach? Locals start enforcing new access law, FLORIDA POLITICS
(July 9, 2018), http://floridapolitics.com/archives/268309-two-women-leaveprivate-beach [https://perma.cc/J4CN-9EW2].
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claim customary use,102 or a landowner suing to eject the beach user,
the burden of proof on the claim of customary use would lie with
the beach user. Therefore, it is not necessarily true that members of
the public are trespassing if they use the dry sand beach in the
absence of a judicial determination of customary use; however,
neither is there a presumption that the public has customary use
rights in any given area.
This lack of clarity produces the dilemma that Walton
County faced, which led to the enactment of its first ordinance on
customary use rights. Lacking certainty, a local government must,
in essence, take sides and either assume that the public lacks
customary use rights or that the public has customary use rights in a
given location. If it accedes to landowners’ requests that beachgoers
be removed as trespassers, it risks violating the public's customary
use rights (and alienating tourists and beachgoers on whom the local
economy may depend). If it fails to exercise its enforcement
discretion to remove tourists in this murky situation, it risks
angering beachfront property owners claiming the right to exclude
the public. Similarly, if landowners erect barriers, law enforcement
officers must decide whether the obstruction interferes with the
public’s customary use rights or not. In Walton County, this placed
the Sheriff's office in the uncomfortable position of making
judgments on complex and fact-intensive legal matters as well as
deciding whether and how to exercise its enforcement in a
politically-charged context.103
Neither position is clearly correct or clearly wrong. Local
governments must decide whether and how to mediate the
respective rights of the public and beachfront landowners. If
customary use rights exist, then the local government arguably
should respect these rights and risks abusing its discretion should it

102. A substantial obstacle to a member of the public bringing such a suit is the
special injury rule, discussed supra Part III(c).
103. Steve Bousquet, Rick Scott Uses Executive Power in an Attempt to Quiet
Beach Access Furor, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 13, 2018),
http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/07/13/rick-scott-usesexecutive-action-in-attempt-to-quiet-beach-access-furor/
[https://perma.cc/7Q69-PZWY].
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wrongly treat the public as trespassers on the dry sand beach. But if
the public has neither customary use rights, a prescriptive easement,
nor other grounds for use (such as nourishment creating public
beach below the Erosion Control Line), then the local government
has grounds to act to protect the rights of the landowners against
trespassers.
However, because enforcement is a highly
discretionary power,104 and because of the uncertainty that surrounds
these determinations in most situations, the local government has
considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to devote
enforcement resources to eject trespassers from the dry sand beach.
B.

The Interplay between Customary Use Ordinances and
Common Law Customary Use Rights

By enacting an ordinance through the local legislative
process in 2017,105 the Walton County Commission sought to create
clarity and reduce conflict. Adopting an ordinance to codify, clarify,
and regulate customary use rights can be a highly effective way to
mediate the conflicts that arise over beach use rights. It can clarify
the murky physical and legal contours of the rights under the
common law described above. Adopting an ordinance also allows
the local government to build on the foundation of customary use
rights and private landowners' property rights to design a set of rules
that will be easier for people to understand and easier to enforce than
the common law. It can provide needed transparency, helping to be
sure everyone knows their rights and what the rules are. The local
government can regulate these rights, tailoring a solution that
addresses the unique situation of their community – people’s
concerns, historic patterns of use, and the changing shoreline.
However, in adopting the ordinance, the local government is
asserting, at least preliminarily by legislative process, that
customary use rights exist, as well as regulating those rights and
ensuring they are protected from interference. Those affected by the
104. See State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986) (“Under Florida's
constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility,
and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding whether and how to
prosecute.”).
105. WALTON COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-2 (amended Mar. 28,
2017, effective Apr. 1, 2017).
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ordinance can still seek judicial review of these findings as well as
the legal basis for the ordinance.
Local governments have the authority to enact ordinances
through their police powers. Police powers are broad and provide
the power to protect public safety, public health, morality, peace and
quiet, and law and order.106 As a creature of the state, a local
government may only exercise the powers that the state expressly
grants to it.107 Florida is a ‘Home Rule’ state because the Florida
Constitution broadly delegated power to its local governments. 108
Local governments in Florida can now exercise “any governmental,
corporate, or proprietary power for a municipal purpose except
when expressly prohibited by law.”109
Walton County’s legislative determination that customary
use existed was upheld by the Federal District Court in a ruling in
Alford v. Walton County,110 interpreting Florida law. The court
concluded that Walton County had not acted outside the scope of its
local home rule authority or usurped a function reserved for the
judiciary—in this case making legislative findings on the existence
of common law customary use on its beaches. 111 The decision in the
Alford case, later vacated by order of the Eleventh Circuit, referred
back to the two counties that had already adopted customary use
106. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
107. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1st ed.
1872).
108. FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. VIII, § 2(b).
109. City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 28 (Fla. 1992).
110. Alford v. Walton Cnty., No. 3:16-CV-362/MCR/CJK, 2017 WL 8785115,
at **11-12
(N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2017) (ruling on cross motions for summary judgment on
challenges to Customary Use Ordinance, holding that Customary Use Ordinance
was “a valid exercise of constitutional and statutory ‘home rule’ authority” by
Walton County and did not usurp judicial function by precluding individual
property owners from seeking judicial review of the ordinance as applied to their
property). This order and judgment were subsequently vacated at the direction of
the Eleventh Circuit without explanation, apparently in response to arguments
that the legislative invalidation of the ordinance mooted the claim. Alford v.
Walton Cnty., No. 17-15741-BB, 2018 BL 229216 (11th Cir. June 27, 2018)
(granting appellants’ motion to vacate District Court order and judgment
concerning customary use ordinance claim).
111. See supra note 100.
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ordinances—St. Johns and Volusia—and to Tona-Rama and
Trepanier for affirmation of the validity of this exercise of
legislative power. The Court pointed out that in both instances, the
counties had expressly stated that their ordinances were not intended
to preclude private property owners subject to the ordinance from
challenging its application to their property in court.112 Trepanier
demonstrates that private property owners could do just that. It is
noteworthy, that with the exception of the Trepanier case, Volusia
and St. Johns County appear to have been free from litigation under
their customary use ordinances.
C.

Legislative Intervention: The Impact of HB 631 on
Customary Use Rights

1.

Understanding What HB 631 Doesn’t Do

This leads to what is perhaps the heart of the confusion about
HB 631, its impact on the public's rights to use any given beach
along Florida's coast. As is explained above, those rights may exist
without regard to whether there has been litigation determining their
existence. If the public’s use meets the test set forth in Tona-Rama,
112. Alford v. Walton County, No. 3:16-CV-362/MCR/CJK, 2017 WL 8785115,
at *11
(N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2017), Judge Rodgers quoted the Volusia County ordinance
which stated:
It is not the intent of the Charter or of this chapter to affect in any way the title
of the owner of land adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean, or to impair the right of any
such owner to contest the existence of the customary right of the public to access
and use any particular area of privately owned beach, or to reduce or limit any
rights of public access or use that may exist or arise other than as customary
rights.
Id. at *14 (quoting VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20-82).
Judge Rodgers also noted that:
The Volusia County ordinance also stated that the county’s intent was “to
determine as a legislative fact binding on county government that since time
immemorial the public has enjoyed access to the beach and has made
recreational use of the beach; [and] that such use has been ancient, reasonable,
without interruption, and free from dispute.” (citing Trepanier v. Cty. of
Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276, 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
Id.
The Order also noted almost identical language from the St. Johns County
ordinance. Id. at n. 29.
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then those rights already exist. Perhaps the most important (and
most frequently misunderstood) point about the new law, evidenced
by the inaccurate media reporting, is that HB 631 in no way changes
common law customary use rights that may exist presently—
whether or not those rights have yet been judicially recognized. 113
Nor does it change the common law standards by which the public
may have beach use rights under any other theories such as
prescription, dedication, or public trust. In other words, the new law
does not affect the public’s common law rights to use the beach as it
has been accustomed to, unless and until a local government chooses
to go forward with the adoption of an ordinance under HB 631’s
statutorily prescribed process.
What HB 631 accomplished is to have uniquely invalidated
Walton County's ordinance114 and imposed new procedural
requirements on those local governments that seek to codify
customary use rights of beachgoers after July 1, 2018.115 The statute
created a new judicial process which it required local governments
to pursue before they could enact a customary use ordinance.
However, prior to the effective date of the law, local governments
were free to enact ordinances following their usual notice and
113. Examples of confusion beginning at the time of the Bill’s adoption abound.
See, e.g., Travis Cohen, Rick Scott Just Signed a Bill That Could Make Many of
Florida's Beaches Private, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/rick-scott-just-signed-a-bill-that-couldmake-many-of-floridas-beaches-private-10231813, [https://perma.cc/UK9WS5NR]; Josh Cascio, Public, landowner opinions split on Florida's new beach
rules, FOX 13 NEWS (Apr. 3, 2018), http://www.fox13news.com/news/localnews/public-landowner-opinions-split-on-floridas-new-beach-rules,
[https://perma.cc/MUS2-UES8]; Ryan Nicol, Banning the beach? Locals start
enforcing new access law, FLORIDA POLITICS (July 9, 2018),
http://floridapolitics.com/archives/268309-two-women-leave-private-beach,
[https://perma.cc/Z9VK-S4K6] (Walton County Sheriff reported as stating that
under HB 631, beaches that are part of private property are now equivalent to a
person’s backyard. “There’s absolutely no difference between a neighborhood
home in the middle of somewhere and walking on the beach.”).
114. The uncertainty on this point reflects an ambiguity in the statute discussed
in the annotated statutory analysis in Part V.a, infra.
115. Because they were in place before January 1, 2016, St. Johns County and
Volusia County’s ordinances were excluded from the statutory preemption. See
FLA. STAT. §163.035(4).
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hearing process, and the District Court in Alford had affirmed that it
was within their power to do so. 116 Thus, the rationale articulated by
the Bill’s sponsors for requiring counties to seek a judicial
declaration of customary use—that enactment of an ordinance
grounded in customary use constituted a legislative usurpation of a
judicial function—has been rejected by a Federal District Court in a
case challenging the ordinance
Moreover, before the new law’s enactment, landowners had
a readily available judicial remedy in the event they believed such
an ordinance to be invalid either because it was ultra vires or
because it effected a taking without just compensation or on other
grounds. If landowners wanted to challenge such an ordinance, they
could seek judicial review of the facial validity of the ordinance or
challenge its specific application to their parcel, as the plaintiffs did
in Trepanier. Thus, the claim that the new law was needed to protect
the judiciary’s prerogative is puzzling, since the judiciary could
easily have rectified any such incursion if a local government’s
action generated controversy and a landowner sought judicial
review, as a number of landowners had.117 Nevertheless, HB 631
required that after July 1, 2018, a local government adopting an
ordinance premised on customary use rights first notify all the
beachfront owners that might be implicated, and then proceed to
court for a “declaration of customary use.” 118 Importantly, this court
proceeding is not a suit directed against the landowners, but a
request that the court decide the legal issue of whether there are
customary use rights in a designated area, even in the absence of a
fact-specific dispute on any given parcel. The result of the
116. Alford v. Walton Cty., No. 3:16-cv-362/MCR/CJK, 2017 WL 8785115, at
*11 (Order vacated by Alford v. Walton Cty., No. 17-15741-BB, 2018 BL
229216 (11th Cir. June 27, 2018).
117. One further possible argument in favor of the statute is that it would reduce
litigation by channeling all claims into one judicial proceeding. However, as is
noted below, it is not at all clear whether all challenges to the ordinance would
properly be raised in the newly created judicial proceeding, or whether the
existence of customary use rights is the sole issue in such a proceeding. In
addition, courts could address multiplicity of litigation, at least in part, by
consolidating cases.
118. FLA. STAT. §163.035(3) (2018).
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proceeding is to ensure that a court decides the question of whether
the public has customary use rights in that area before any ordinance
goes into effect. The new law gives every affected landowner the
right to intervene in the proceeding if they want to, but they are not
required to participate.119 However, the law is silent as to whether
members of the public or their advocates have any right to intervene.
This perhaps explains the widespread perception that the new law
represented an attack on the public’s rights: HB 631 did make
codification and recognition of the public’s customary use rights by
local governments more difficult. In doing so, the law placed
additional burdens on the preexisting process available for asserting
and clarifying public customary use rights. If one seeks to assess
the impact of HB 631 on the balance of public and private rights, it
seems fair to say that the law placed a thumb on the scale in favor
of beachfront landowners and against assertion of public customary
use rights.120 When one adds this to the impact of the special injury
rule, this is arguably not insignificant. Thus, despite the inaccurate
and exaggerated nature of the claims regarding the law’s impact on
the public’s use rights, there is a kernel of truth in characterizing it
as an effort to weaken the public’s rights. This kernel finds
substance in the extensive advocacy on behalf of landowners and
property rights advocates in the courts and the legislature seeking to
diminish public customary use rights. While landowners and their
advocates frame these efforts in terms of protecting private property
rights, these efforts would be achieved by creating new hurdles for
local governments to clear before recognizing and codifying
customary use rights.
119. FLA. STAT. §163.035(b)(1)(2018).
120. Statements by one of the Bill’s sponsors and by the incoming Senate
President suggest that the intent of the Bill was to protect private property rights.
See Pittman, supra note 1 (quoting Sen. Kathleen Passidomo as stating that “she
found it ‘appalling’ that a city or county can pass an ordinance undercutting
private property rights. ‘If you’re going to take away somebody’s property you
have to do it through the courts’”); News Service of Florida, supra note 7
(quoting Senate President Bill Galvano as stating, “I think there was a lot of
misunderstanding around that bill, and I was very clear through the summer, and
when members would call, to emphasize what we were doing was just bolstering
private property rights”).
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Nonetheless, nothing in the law can be fairly construed to
affect the public's preexisting common law customary use rights, or
private landowners' preexisting common law rights to exclude in
any way. These co-relative rights remain in theoretical equipoise
until they are determined under the common law process or under
the statutory process, pursuant to local ordinance. Private
landowners have no greater right to exclude the public either by
physical barrier or by invoking trespass laws than they had prior to
the law's enactment. Moreover, beachgoers in those communities
that choose not to enact an ordinance pursuant to the statute have
every right to assert their customary use rights, until a court prohibits
it. If a trespass claim were brought against them, the beachgoers
would prevail if they successfully proved their claim of customary
use rights. However, the likelihood of such a prosecution in the
current climate seems low.121
Whatever common law customary use rights beachgoers
had in Walton County before the enactment of HB 631, these rights
remained after the enactment of the law and after its effective date
of July 1, 2018. What HB 631 changed was that it appeared to
uniquely invalidate the Walton County ordinance, 122 thereby
121. Compare Steve Bousquet, Rick Scott Uses Executive Power in an Attempt
to Quiet Beach Access Furor, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 13, 2018),
http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/07/13/rick-scott-usesexecutive-action-in-attempt-to-quiet-beach-access-furor/,
[https://perma.cc/7Q69-PZWY] (quoting State Attorney for judicial circuit that
includes Walton County as stating “Any person trespassing on private property
above the high water line may be subject to arrest”)with Brittany Weiner, New
Florida Law Changes Beach Access in the Panhandle, NEWS 4 (July 17, 2018),
https://www.wsmv.com/news/new-florida-law-changes-beach-access-in-thepanhandle/article_fbe8ae36-5f9b-5452-ac194c2af5068338.html#.W08ICV9XpRE.email, [https://perma.cc/SH7Q-Q33E]
(quoting Walton County Sheriff explaining decision not to enforce trespass law
on dry sand beach based on attorney’s legal guidance that trespassing on the
beach cannot result in prosecution). Governor Scott’s Executive Order, while
not addressing privately owned beaches, also urged state attorneys to “take
appropriate actions to ensure that the ability of the public to access Florida’s
public beaches in accordance with longstanding Florida law is preserved and is
not infringed.” Fla. Exec. Order No. 18-202 (July 12, 2018),
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/EO-18-202.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SCD4-YK8D].
122. The ambiguity surrounding this issue is discussed further below.
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invalidating the County’s legislative overlay on the common law.
However, any common law rights under the customary use doctrine
are unaffected by the new law, a key point that the general public
and private property owners, fueled by media coverage of the issue,
often failed to grasp.123
By apparent design, under a grandparenting provision included
in the measure preventing its application to ordinances adopted and
in effect on or before January 1, 2016, the Walton County ordinance
was the only extant ordinance affected by the law; the provision
preserved all other counties’ ordinances that predated Walton
County’s. In fact, only two counties had adopted customary use
ordinances prior to Walton County’s effort—Volusia County of
Tona-Rama fame and St. Johns County, its northern neighbor. As
noted above, neither of these ordinances have been facially
challenged, and both explicitly preserve beachfront property
owner’s right to challenge customary use on their dry sand beach. 124
2.

A Confounding Wrinkle

The story does not end with the statutory preemption of
local home rule authority to enact customary use ordinances
pursuant to local processes, however. Much of the detail of the new
law was first introduced in a last-minute amendment on the floor of
the House that replaced the initial two-sentence bill. The final
version included a new provision that seemed to preserve the right
of local governments to enact a customary use ordinance until the
effective date of the statute. It did so by providing that governmental
entities may use customary use “as an affirmative defense in a
proceeding challenging an ordinance or rule adopted before July 1,
123. Blanks, supra note 91; Josh Cascio, Public, Landowner Opinions Split on
Florida's New Beach Rules, FOX 13 NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018),
http://www.fox13news.com/news/local-news/public-landowner-opinions-spliton-floridas-new-beach-rules, [https://perma.cc/V36A-FMNR]; Allie Raffa, The
battle over beach access in Florida heats up, FOX NEWS (Apr. 17, 2018),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/04/17/battle-over-beach-access-inflorida-heats-up.html, [https://perma.cc/3BYN-UDPU].
124. See VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 20-82; ST. JOHNS
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.01.
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2018,”125 seemingly in direct contradiction to the provision
preserving from invalidation only ordinances passed before January
1, 2016. There is no legislative history to parse. While the rationale
for this addition to the Bill is unclear, its import is equally so.
Arguably, this gave local governments the right until July 1, 2018,
to adopt the same sorts of ordinances that were otherwise
invalidated, and then to defend the validity of those ordinances when
they are challenged, which is presumably what would be done in
any case. This prompted another wave of public outcry and media
attention as some local governments scrambled to meet the
deadline.126 The import of these ordinances and how their legal
status may differ from both the preexisting ordinances (Volusia and
St. Johns) and post-enactment ordinances that use the statutorily
mandated process, are questions that may need to be resolved if
these ordinances are challenged as preempted. In contrast, Walton
County has initiated the process outlined under Fla. Stat. 163.035
seeking a declaration that customary use exists on all beaches within
the County.127 However, heated conflict continues to bedevil the
County’s effort to clarify the public’s rights. 128
D.

The Governor’s Executive Order

Governor Scott’s involvement with this topic did not end
with his signing of HB 631. In the wake of the new law’s enactment,
he repeatedly sought to correct the record on the impact of the new
law. Perhaps because of the reality that the law made protection of
public rights more difficult and energized landowners to assert
125. H.R. 631, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018).
126. There is no statewide clearinghouse for local ordinance adoption, so it is
difficult to know with certainty how many jurisdictions took advantage of this
apparent loophole. However, at a minimum, “affirmative defense” ordinances
have been adopted by Flagler County, Nassau County, Fernandina Beach, St.
Petersburg and Naples.
127. See Tom McLaughlin, Walton County Seeks Declaration of Customary
Use, NWFDAILYNEWS.COM (Dec. 14, 2018)
https://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20181214/walton-county-seeksdeclaration-of-customary-use.
128. See Tom McLaughlin, Two Property Owners Escalate Walton Customary
Use Debate, NWFDAILYNEWS.COM (July 8, 2019)
https://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20190708/two-property-owners-escalatewalton-customary-use-debate.
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greater rights, these efforts were not entirely successful; media
reports continued to characterize the law as restricting the public’s
rights to use the beach. Landowners’ efforts to exclude tourists
generated adverse publicity for a state dependent on tourism. Both
the Bill’s sponsors129 and Governor Scott’s office130 sought to
distance themselves from these unanticipated adverse impacts on
beachgoers and to emphasize that the Bill’s impact was limited to
the process local governments were required to follow in adopting
ordinances.
Following the law’s effective date and the attendant
renewed public attention, Governor Scott took an additional step.
He issued an Executive Order titled “Preserving Public Beach
Access.”131 The general thrust of the executive order was to buttress
public access to publicly-owned beaches; however, regulation of the
area affected by HB 631— privately owned beaches — falls largely
to local governments and outside the Governor’s jurisdiction (absent
legislation authorizing him to act). Thus, his Order focused
primarily on state agencies and did little to resolve the conflict or
alter the balance between public and private rights.
In Section 1, the Order directs the heads of state agencies
headed by gubernatorial appointees not to adopt any rule restricting
public access to any beach that has an established customary use,
129. See Laura Ruane, Private Versus Public Beach Rights: We're Still Sorting
Out What the New State Law Means, NAPLES NEWS (July 29, 2018),
https://www.naplesnews.com/story/news/2018/07/29/southwest-florida-beachesgovernments-closely-watching-access-laws/858869002/; Raffa, supra note 113,
[https://perma.cc/6PRK-JGVB] (reporting Sen. Passidomo as saying that the bill
will actually expand beach access – not take it away); Katie Edwards-Walpole,
Edwards-Walpole Defends Her Beach Access Law, SUN SENTINEL (July 28,
2018), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/fl-op-viewpoint-beach-accessedwards-walpole-20180727-story.html, [https://perma.cc/5AFH-W8K5].
130. John Kennedy, Beach Lovers Push Back on New Property Rights Law,
HERALD TRIBUNE (Apr. 16, 2018),
http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20180414/beach-lovers-push-back-on-newproperty-rights-law, [https://perma.cc/ABT2-6JJV] (quoting John Tupps, a
spokesperson for the Governor, as stating that the law does not ban the public
from accessing private beach areas or privatize beach access in any way).
131. Fla. Exec. Order No. 18-202 (July 12, 2018), https://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/EO-18-202.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7K6-MM8A].
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unless necessary for public safety. Section 2 directs the Secretary of
DEP and Director of the Florida State Parks system to engage in all
appropriate efforts to ensure access to Florida’s public beaches is
not restricted. It specifically directs creation of an online reporting
tool for the public to report violations of their right to public beach
access, as well as requiring a report to the legislature.
Recognizing the Executive’s lack of authority to direct
local governments on this subject, Section 3 “urges” the heads of all
other governmental entities to refrain from adopting rules or
ordinances to restrict or eliminate access to Florida’s public
beaches. Section 4 urges State Attorneys to take appropriate actions
to ensure the ability to access Florida’s public beaches “in
accordance with longstanding Florida law” is preserved and not
infringed.
While the general direction of the order clearly seeks to
protect public rights, its impact is circumscribed. First, in Section 1,
the Order only affects agencies headed by an appointee serving at
the governor’s pleasure; in other words, a subset of state agencies.
Given that there had been no suggestion before or after HB 631’s
passage that any state agencies had taken steps to interfere with the
public’s rights on privately-owned dry sand beach, this section
doesn’t address the root of the conflict over customary use.
However, at the least, it preempted any efforts that state agencies
might have taken to restrict public access to private beaches subject
to customary use.
Section 1 also refers specifically to not impairing access to
beaches with “established” customary use. It is unclear what the
term “established” is intended to signify. It could mean that the
Order merely refers to customary use already established in a
judicial proceeding pursuant to HB 631 or those counties with
grandfathered customary use ordinances (Volusia and St. Johns). If
this is the meaning, then the Order leaves the balance where HB 631
had left it. If it means any customary use established through use,
then it might seek to prevent impairment of access on other beaches
where the public’s actions meet the standard for customary use. The
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latter seems highly unlikely since it would amount to executive
recognition of customary use.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Order are each of limited effect
in that they address only access to publicly owned beaches. In a
time of conflict over access to privately-owned dry sand, it makes
sense to ensure that the public beaches are fully accessible. But
these provisions do not address the conflict that HB 631 fueled.
Section 2 of the Order explicitly addresses two state agencies with
managerial responsibility for state-owned public beaches and directs
them to ensure public access is not restricted. Sections 3 and 4,
implicitly acknowledging the limits of the Governor’s power, are
limited in an additional way; they are merely hortatory.
Respectively, they exhort other governmental entities, including
local governments, not to adopt rules restricting access to public
beaches (Section 3), and urge State Attorneys to take appropriate
steps to ensure public access to public beaches is not infringed
(Section 4).
Thus, the Governor’s executive action bolstered and
confirmed the commitment to protection of public access to public
beaches but had limited, if any, impact on the heart of the conflict:
public access to privately-owned dry sand beach.
V. ANALYSIS OF HB 631/FLA. STAT. 163.035
A.

An Annotated Summary of Fla. Stat. §163.035

The law that has precipitated much of the uncertainty over
public use of privately-owned dry sand beaches is now codified in
the Florida Statutes as Fla. Stat. §163.035. This section provides a
section-by-section summary of the statute and offers comments
concerning legal issues surrounding the bill.
The statute’s central command is addressed to
“governmental entities”, a term defined in subsection 1 of the statute
to encompass state agencies and regional and local governments,
including counties and municipalities. Subsection 2 of the statute
provides that these entities “may not adopt or keep in effect an

44

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

ordinance or rule that finds, determines, relies on, or is based upon
customary use” of the dry sand beach unless it is based on “a judicial
declaration affirming recreational customary use” on the beach in
question.
This language creates ambiguity and seems to be
inconsistent with subsection 3(b)(2) of the statute. The prohibition
on adopting an ordinance or rule would seem to prohibit a
governmental entity from taking action to adopt an ordinance after
the statute’s effective date of July 1, 2018. However, the added
prohibition on keeping in effect a rule or ordinance in effect would
only seem to have independent meaning if it required governmental
entities with existing ordinances to repeal them. Yet, subsection
3(b)(2) specifically grandfathers in all ordinances in effect before
January 1, 2016, and authorizes governmental entities to raise
customary use as an affirmative defense in any proceeding
challenging an ordinance or rule adopted any time before the
statute’s effective date. This seems to authorize governmental
entities with ordinances adopted between January 1, 2016 and July
1, 2018 to keep their ordinances in effect by providing them the
opportunity to defend them if challenged in court. This sends
conflicting messages about whether the legislature sought to
sanction local governments adopting ordinances before July 1, 2018.
Subsection 3 provides that a governmental entity seeking to
affirm the existence of recreational customary use must follow a
new procedure that entails both legislative and judicial components,
further defined in that subsection. The new step in the legislative
process outlined in subsection 3(a) requires that the governing board
of the governmental entity first “must, at a public hearing, adopt a
notice of intent to affirm the existence of a recreational customary
use on private property.”132 This notice of intent must specify the
specific parcels or portions of parcels to be included, the “detailed,
specific, and individual uses”, and “each source of evidence” the
governmental entity plans to rely on to prove a recreational

132

FLA. STAT. §163.035(3)(a) (2018).

2020]

Recreational Rights to the Dry Sand Beach

45

customary use has been “ancient, reasonable, without interruption,
and free from dispute.”
It is unclear what meaning should be given to the modifier
“individual” in reference to uses. It could mean only that each use
must be identified individually, in keeping with the modifiers
“detailed and specific”. The language relating to the proof of
customary use is drawn directly from the Florida Supreme Court’s
opinion in the Tona-Rama case, and embodies the common law
standard articulated and applied in that case to find customary use
of Daytona Beach’s dry sand beaches.
Subsection 3 also requires that prior to the public hearing at
which the governmental entity adopts its notice of intent, it must
“provide notice” of the hearing to the owner of each affected parcel
at the address reflected in the county property appraiser’s records no
later than 30 days before the hearing. In addition to sending the
notice by certified mail, the entity must publish it in a newspaper of
general circulation and post the notice on the entity’s website.
Subsection (3)(b) outlines the judicial portion of the newly
created process for obtaining a declaration of recreational customary
use. The governmental entity must file a “Complaint for
Declaration of Recreational Customary Use” within sixty days of
the adoption of the notice of intent outlined in subsection 3(a). The
entity must provide notice of the filing of the complaint to the
owners of affected parcels in the same manner required in
subsection 3(a), and then must provide the court with verification of
service of the notice on the property owners required by the statute’s
terms. In light of the reference to service in the same manner
required by subsection 3(a), this appears to mean service by certified
mail rather than any other legal form of service of process.
Subsection 3(b)(1) provides that the notice must “allow” the
owner receiving the notice to intervene in the judicial proceeding
within 45 days after receiving the notice. It is unclear how the notice
itself would actually grant the owner the right to intervene. It seems
likely that this means that the notice must inform the owner of the
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right to intervene created by the statute within 45 days of receipt.
Subsection 3(b)(2) specifically provides owners of parcels of
property subject to the complaint the right to intervene as party
defendants in the proceeding.
Subsection 3(b)(2) prescribes that the judicial proceeding
shall be de novo, and that “[t]he court must determine whether the
evidence presented demonstrates that the recreational customary use
for the use or uses identified in the notice of intent have been
ancient, reasonable, without interruption, and free from dispute.” It
also provides that there is no presumption regarding the existence of
a recreational customary use and that the governmental entity has
the burden of proof. Subsection 3(b)(2) grants owners of parcels of
property subject to the complaint the right to intervene as party
defendants.
The final substantive provision of the statute, subsection 4,
grandfathers in ordinances or rules adopted and in effect on or before
January 1, 2016. The effect of this date is to preserve the validity of
the ordinances adopted by Volusia County and the St. Johns County
while invalidating the Walton County ordinance, conflict over
which seems to have been the motivating force behind the
legislation. It also provides that the statute “does not deprive a
governmental entity from raising customary use as an affirmative
defense in any proceeding challenging an ordinance or rule adopted
before July 1, 2018.” Section 14 of HB 631 set July 1, 2018, as the
statute’s effective date. As noted above, this provision authorizing
customary use to serve as a defense of ordinances adopted up until
July 1, 2018, appears to stand in some conflict with the language of
subsection 2, which prohibits a governmental entity from “keep[ing]
in effect” a rule or ordinance that finds, determines, relies on or is
based upon customary use unless the ordinance is based on a judicial
declaration. But if a governmental entity successfully defends an
ordinance based on customary use, presumably the ordinance is
valid, and the entity can keep it in effect. One possible reading that
reconciles the two provisions is that the governmental entity might
arguably be in violation of the statute by “keeping in effect” the
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ordinance adopted between January 1, 2016, and July 1, 2018.
However, if the entity successfully defends the ordinance based on
customary use, the ordinance is then based on a judicial declaration
of the existence of customary use and no longer in violation of
subsection 1, even though the governmental entity has not followed
the new process outlined in subsection 3.
B.

Additional Unanswered Questions Raised by Fla. Stat.
163.035

In addition to the issues noted in the analysis above, the
unique judicial proceeding outlined in subsection 3(b) raises a
number of significant questions. The parameters of the proceeding
that are defined include:
•
•
•
•

How and to whom notice of the complaint must be given;
The de novo nature of the proceeding;
The issue to be determined by the court and the legal
standard to be applied;
The allocation of the burden of proof; and

The right of owners of property subject to the complaint to
intervene.
Questions the statute does not address and which courts will
need to decide include:
•
•

•

•

The standard of proof to be applied in the proceeding for a
judicial declaration;
Whether the court should make a parcel-by-parcel
determination or a ruling on all parcels regarding the
existence of customary use;
Whether the governmental entity seeking the declaration has
authority to withdraw parcels to which it has issued a notice
of intent, in order to avoid challenge;
If the governmental entity can withdraw a parcel, whether it
thereby concedes any customary use rights the public may
have on a given parcel;
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Whether members of the public or their advocates have the
right to intervene in a proceeding, and whether they must
establish special injury;
Whether landowners who intervene in the judicial
proceeding can raise any issues beyond the existence of
customary use;
Whether the judicial declaration is immediately appealable
or whether appeal is available only from the final ordinance
or rule adopted by the governmental entity;
Whether landowners who have intervened can thereafter
raise the same issue (the existence of adequate evidence to
prove customary use) on judicial review of the ordinance or
rule ultimately adopted by the governmental entity; and, if
so, whether they are restricted to raising the issue as to their
own parcel; and

Whether landowners who have not intervened in the proceeding
seeking a judicial declaration can raise the issue of the adequacy of
the evidence to support customary use on judicial review of the
ordinance or rule ultimately adopted by the governmental entity.
VI. OPTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
A wide array of voices have called for the repeal of Fla. Stat.
§163.035 since its enactment. The law cast a spotlight on beach
access, but one that has shed distorted light, and resulted in
widespread misunderstanding of the state of the law (both pre- and
post-statute law) by beachfront property owners and members of the
public. Indeed, Exhibit A in any customary use claim might be the
outrage and disbelief expressed by members of the beachgoing
public in the wake of the statute, which suggest how many members
of the public believed they had an existing right to use the dry sand
beach. Although the law was touted by its sponsors as a tool to
resolve conflict and reduce litigation, it seems clear, at least to date,
that it has not achieved these goals.133 Indeed, it appears to have
See,e.g., Blessey v. Walton Cnty, No. 3:18-cv-01415-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla.
(Nov. 7, 2018)(Order dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
complaint seeking a declaration that customary use was unconstitutional which
133
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awakened a sleeping giant, albeit in part as a result of false narratives
about the law’s privatizing effect.
In an ironic twist, the actions by landowners emboldened by the
enactment of the law claiming new-found rights to exclude the
public, have now given truth to the false narratives. Although
perhaps unintended by many legislators who supported and even
sponsored the Bill, an indirect effect of the law’s enactment has been
not just to create conflict, but to threaten the ability of the public to
continue uses of beaches located around the state which may or may
not be longstanding customary uses. 134 Thus, although the statute
itself did not measurably shift the balance between public and
private rights, it has prompted claims and actions by private
landowners that do threaten public rights. The Governor’s issuance
of the Executive Order, while not affecting rights on privatelyowned beaches, represented a clear acknowledgement of this threat
and the need to take steps to ensure public rights are protected.
Given the importance of the issues at stake—public beach
access and private property owners’ rights—and the broad and
important recreational, economic, property, and dignity interests
involved, consideration of further legislative action seems
warranted. This section outlines three options and describes some of
the advantages and disadvantages of each. These options include
maintaining the status quo and letting the statute play itself out,
repealing the statute and returning to the status quo that existed prior
to the statute, and repealing and/or amending the statute, including
some suggestions for policies to incorporate in a revised statute that
enhance lateral beach access without resort to the customary use
was filed after County ordinance was invalidated and before County had begun
process under statute to adopt a new ordinance,); see also Tom McLaughlin,
Two Property Owners Escalate Walton Customary Use Debate,
NWFDAILYNEWS.COM (July 8, 2019)
https://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20190708/two-property-owners-escalatewalton-customary-use-debate.
134 See Blanks, supra n. 91; Kimberly Miller, Palm Beach County Residents
Fear Beach Access Will Be Cut Off After New Law, MY PALM BEACH POST Jul
19, 2018, https://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/weather/residents-fear-beachaccess-will-cut-off-after-new-law/ZRinNeLg2DfsXjP3OF5D8K/,
[https://perma.cc/3U5S-JVBQ].
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doctrine. Elements within these options, such as providing property
tax relief to beachfront property owners who do not contest
recreational use, and recreational use exactions in coastal
construction control line permitting, are not mutually exclusive.
1.

Maintain the status quo and allow the statute play out over
time

A first option is to take no further legislative action. It is
possible that over time legal challenges resulting from the statute’s
application could produce judicial decisions that clarify the true
impact of the statute and eliminate or reduce conflict and confusion.
One scenario that could produce such a ruling would be a
landowner might sue local law enforcement for failing to eject
beachgoers from their property, (wrongly) claiming rights to do so
under the statute. However, this type of claim seems likely to fail
without necessarily producing a definitive interpretation of the
statute because of the considerable discretion afforded to
government agencies in enforcement decisions. 135 Failure to enforce
claims are extremely difficult to prosecute.
Also, some jurisdictions, including Walton County, have
begun proceedings under HB 631’s new process for enactment of an
ordinance. Before changing the law further, the legislature should
monitor and assess carefully, potential adverse impacts and costs to
local governments like Walton County that have sought to follow
the legislature’s guidance.
However, an argument against doing nothing is that the
status quo under HB 631 exacerbates an imbalance that existed
before the statute’s enactment. The power to enact local ordinances
rests with local elected bodies, and the statute appears to confer the
ability to intervene in customary use judicial determination
proceedings on beachfront property owners only. Except to the
State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986) (holding that under Florida's
constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility,
and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding whether and how to
prosecute.).
135
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extent that the interests of beachgoers and advocates of beach access
align with and are represented parens patriae by the local
government, their interests appear to be excluded. The statute thus
exacerbates the imbalance already created by application of the
special injury rule in this context, which remains a significant hurdle
for this constituency. As noted above, the right of the public to
intervene in the judicial proceeding under the new law remains
unclear and untested. 136
Importantly, the statute does not expressly preempt the
common law, it only affects the process that local governments who
choose to adopt an ordinance must use to give effect to the common
law. As a result, it would appear that affirmative cases seeking to
establish customary use can continue to be brought by nongovernmental parties with standing do so, such as beach-tourism
dependent businesses, for example, even if a local government has
not sought to codify customary use pursuant to the statute. It is also
possible that individuals or entities adversely affected by property
owners’ actions could overcome the special injury rule and
successfully challenge a local government’s actions in ejecting
beachgoers from the dry sand beach. Or, as in Tona-Rama, a
business interest might challenge one or more other private
landowners’ actions based on customary use rights of the public.
The no-action option described above has the advantage
perhaps of creating no additional confusion by further legislative
action. But it does little to address the ongoing widespread public
confusion about beach access rights and the recent surge in actions
by property owners to exclude the public. Whether this option is the
best one available depends on a variety of factors, including the
costs associated with ongoing conflict—from impacts on public
rights and on beach tourism.

Even if members of the public are ultimately excluded from the judicial
process by which customary use rights are determined under the new statute, it
may be that creative litigants could find and assert distinct customary uses of the
beach not covered by the ordinance. If these use rights were not covered by the
ordinance or determined by the court, their existence might remain a litigable
issue, provided the party could overcome the special injury rule.
136
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Repeal (revert to common law)

A second option is to repeal Fla. Stat. §163.035. The impact
of a repeal would be yet another reset. One reason for repealing the
statute would be to eliminate the confusion it has created. A repeal
without further action, however, seems likely to produce conflicting
and confusing counter-narratives; narratives opposite to those
narratives generated by the statute. These would likely be infected
by the same distorted understanding of the statute. Property owners
who have wrongly claimed that the statute granted them new rights
would likely claim that the repeal deprived them of those same
asserted rights. And some members of the public might wrongly
believe that the repeal gave them rights beyond those afforded by
common law and existing statutes and ordinances.
As is noted above, a central legal argument advanced as a
justification for the statute is that legislative bodies should not
recognize or rely on findings of customary use in ordinances or rules
unless a court has already determined that customary use exists.
Supporters of the statute have characterized ordinances that
recognize customary use as “usurping a judicial function.” This
claim was rejected by the District Court in Alford. However, if this
was the correct view, then an existing or post-repeal ordinance
adopted without a judicial determination could be viewed as legally
invalid.
As a practical matter, however, there is still a clear remedy
for this: the ordinance can be challenged. It could be argued that
this is inadequate because the effect of allowing governmental
entities to adopt these ordinances would be to shift the burden to
landowners to seek judicial review of the ordinance. However, this
seems a weak argument for legislative intervention, given that resort
to judicial review is the typical remedy for invalid actions by
governmental entities. It is unclear what threat to the judicial system
is posed by allowing this issue to be resolved, first, as a legislative
matter, and then reviewed by a court on judicial review of an
ordinance. Moreover, should a court determine that a governmental
entity’s rule or ordinance is a usurpation of the judicial function,
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then governmental entities will be on notice and can act in
accordance with this knowledge.
The strongest argument against repeal and in favor of
requiring local governments to follow the new procedures imposed
by HB 631 is a corollary to and depends on the validity of the claim
that enactment of customary use ordinances is outside the authority
of local governments. This argument in favor of the statute is that
if local governments cannot adopt ordinances relying on or
establishing customary use without a prior judicial determination,
then governmental entities have no viable process for seeking
proactively to resolve conflict over customary use. The only
available judicial means for the government to seek a declaratory
judgment would be to file a complaint naming the owners of all
affected parcels as defendants. Both from a political and a practical
standpoint, this is unworkable. First, it imposes potentially
significant costs on the landowners, regardless of whether they
object to public use or not. Second, elected officials are highly
unlikely to want to sue their constituents in order to resolve this
conflict. Thus, the argument in favor of the statute is that it creates
a judicial process that is not a lawsuit against the landowners, but a
proceeding more like a bond validation proceeding—a judicial
proceeding in which the landowners have the option to intervene,
but one in which they are not involuntarily named as defendants.
However, this argument in favor of keeping the statute
remains seriously flawed. As is noted above, there is no apparent
reason why the legislature needed to preempt the courts from
determining the underlying legal issue of whether adoption of such
an ordinance is appropriate. 137 This strengthens the argument for
repealing the statute, a move that would leave the question of the
propriety of governmental entities adopting customary use
ordinances for the courts to determine.
One might even argue that the legislature is usurping a judicial function by
trying to preclude judicial resolution of this separation of powers question – a
question of constitutional interpretation and therefore one that clearly should be
ultimately determined by the courts. The statute, by precluding local
governments from adopting an ordinance, would likely preclude a court from
ever determining the validity of this claimed constitutional problem.
137
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Repeal alone would offer some other advantages. By
eliminating the newly created judicial process for seeking a
declaration of customary use, it would remove the attendant
possibility that this new process has actually multiplied the
opportunities for litigation and the issues to be litigated related to
customary use, rather than reducing the multiplicity of litigation.
However, a countervailing concern is that several local governments
have begun proceedings under the new statute. Thus, repeal alone
would likely generate its own wave of confusion regarding the status
of any ordinances adopted, or in the process of being adopted, under
the statute. This leads to the third option: to amend or repeal and
replace Fla. Stat. §163.035.
3.

Amend or Repeal and Replace

Customary use of privately-owned beaches has moved from
the shadows to the front pages and has become a topic of widespread
public attention and interest. The history in Walton County
demonstrates that relying on the common law as a vehicle for
resolving conflicts over customary use, or for determining whether
customary use exists, has numerous drawbacks. As noted above,
these include legal, practical, and political obstacles to local
governments or members of the public who seek to obtain a judicial
determination of customary use rights. The resulting void generated
conflict, resulting in the legislation that has compounded that
conflict.
Repealing or substantially amending the statute could
remove the new hurdles the statute creates for governmental entities
enacting ordinances or rules based on customary use and eliminate
any litigation over interpretive issues created by the statute. This
would leave local governments with fewer obstacles to enacting
ordinances or rules meant to resolve conflict. However, conflict is
not likely to dissipate with repeal of Fla. Stat. §163.035 alone. In
Walton County at least, it seems clear that some beachfront property
owners and property rights advocates are committed to challenging
the legality of the customary use doctrine as a background principle
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of the common law in Florida. Thus, some additional legislative
guidance may be warranted.
An amended or substitute statute could retain any aspects of
the law the benefits of which outweigh their disadvantages. For
example, to respect the interests of those government entities that
have begun judicial proceedings for declarations of customary use,
the legislature could retain the newly created judicial process, but
make it an optional avenue for local governments that want to ensure
they have judicial confirmation of the bounds of customary use in
their jurisdiction before they enact an ordinance. For those local
governments for which this is a wiser path, the process would be
available. For those that have sufficient confidence in the contours
of customary use and the public support for its codification, this
process would no longer be necessary. This would also moot any
legal issues regarding the status of ordinances enacted in the window
between the statute’s enactment and July 1, 2018; thus, eliminating
another source of potential conflict.
The prospect of amendment raises the question of whether
there are further steps outside the footprint of the current law that
the legislature could take to reduce conflict over privately-owned
dry sand beach, regardless of whether the area is subject to
customary use by the beach-going public. There are several areas
of law and policy related to the balance of rights and duties of
landowners and the public that are additional sources of contention
which may aggravate or promote conflict over dry sand beach
access. It is worth considering whether legislative measures
addressing these issues might provide levers that help to alleviate
conflict and promote a fairer, more consistent set of practices
regarding beach access statewide. The suggestions provided below
will require further research and analysis, both as a matter of law
and public policy, but they offer starting points for consideration of
the contours of further legislative action.
Property Tax Incentives. Tax policy is a widely recognized tool
available to guide behavior and promote public policy. In this
context, local property taxation is the most significant point of
intersection with the dry sand beach. A factor discussed by the
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Florida Supreme Court in Tona-Rama and an argument raised by
landowners who seek to restrict or oppose customary use currently,
is the fact that the owners pay taxes on the dry sand beach being
used by the public,138 while under the customary use doctrine their
property rights are being restricted in a way most landowners do not
experience.
Although methods vary, some local jurisdictions already
relieve the tax burden of beachfront for dry sand beach that is used
by the public.139 Some counties do not assess property for tax
purposes on this portion of the property at all, 140 and others reduce
the valuation of the property or assess it at a reduced percentage to
account for the regulatory constraints on development of the dry
sand beach. The legislature could explicitly recognize landowners
who allow public access by directing property appraisers to take this
into consideration. In fact, this could be a default policy, and only
when a property owner both possesses and asserts a valid right to
exclude the public would the property be taxed at the value that
recognizes the asserted exclusionary right.
Land Acquisition Programs. Florida is known for its robust
history of land acquisition for conservation, including recreation,
although this history is not without its own recent controversies. 141
This was a factor noted by the Florida Supreme Court in its Tona-Rama
decision as well as by Justice Boyd in his dissent in that case. City of Daytona
Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75, 80 (Fla. 1974) (5-2 decision)
(Boyd, J., dissenting). It has also been raised by plaintiffs in at least one of the
cases challenging Walton County’s ordinance. Second Amended Complaint at
31, Seaside Town Council v. Walton Cty., No. 3:17-cv-00682-MCR-CJK (N.D.
Fla. Aug. 22, 2018).
139 The authors conducted an informal telephonic survey of coastal county
property appraisers. Approaches to assessment and taxation of dry sand beach
appear to vary widely and are not always clearly documented. However, it
seems clear that property appraisers exercise considerable discretion as to
whether and how the dry sand beach is considered in assessing property taxes.
140 Flagler County, in its post-HB 631 proposed Customary Use Ordinance
asserts as an “additional finding” that: “The Flagler County Property Appraiser
does not assess the Dry Sand Beach portion of parcels along the coastline for the
purposes of ad valorem taxation, whether owned by the property owner or not.”
141 A 2014 voter approved constitutional amendment has been the subject of
extensive litigation over the State’s use of the funds for what the plaintiffs argue
are illegitimate uses such as general departmental administration. Fla. Defenders
138
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Another means to ensure beach access is to acquire recreational
access easements over the dry sand beach. Easements are a
remarkably flexible tool and can be tailored to include the regulatory
and beach management requirements of local governments. Priority
could be given to extending the recreational reach of existing state
and local recreation areas, and in proximity to dune crossovers that
provide beach access. Recreational access easements could
incorporate other conservation values such as the protection of sea
turtle and shore bird nesting habitats. 142
Additionally, funds generated under the 2014 Land
Acquisition Amendment to the Florida Constitution can likely be
used for beach nourishment projects (as a form of “restoration”).
Such projects create new publicly owned dry sand and provide
public access to that sand. These funds could also be used to acquire
the dry sand beach above the erosion control line in fee, or through
less than fee arrangements, either in conjunction with nourishment
projects or on their own.
However, both Florida and federal law constrain the use of
public funds if proposed nourishment projects do not include
adequate perpendicular access to the nourished beach, based on the
public policy determination that state and federal dollars should not
be spent nourishing beaches that the public cannot reach. 143
Although likely to be controversial, this policy could be revisited to
allow nourishment on beaches that do not qualify due to the lack of
perpendicular access, by further conditioning nourishment on the
of the Env’t, Inc. v. Detzner, Nos. 2015-CA-002682, 2015-CA-001423, 2018
WL 3519257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 28, 2018).
142 See Jen Lomberk et al., Less-Than-Fee Beachfront Acquisition Strategies to
Protect and Enhance Sea Turtle Nesting Habitat in Florida (Oct. 2017),
https://www.law.ufl.edu/law/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Less-Than-Fee-SeaTurtle-White-Paper-10.19.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TL6-JYMM].
.
143 33 U.S.C. § 426g (2018); FLA. STAT. § 161.101(12) (2012); See History and
Evolution of Laws Relating to Beach Nourishment, NOAA COASTAL SERVICES
CENTER, 3-4 (2007), http://hamcamp.net/BeachNourishmentRev.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/ME3D-RVFH]. (“Federal interest in a beach nourishment
program is conditioned by: the public ownership of land or facilities adjacent to
the beach (or private ownership as long as public access and use is provided
along with adequate parking”)).
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provision of access between the dunes and the erosion control line,
an area that would otherwise remain in private ownership following
a nourishment project.
Revocable Licenses and Management Agreements. In addition to
real property transfers, consideration could be given to creating a
statutory framework for the use of revocable licenses as a propertybased instrument to promote public beach access. Florida already
encourages these arrangements where landowners open up their
property to recreational uses such as hunting, fishing, and hiking by
providing liability protection to private property owners and
eliminating the duty of care under the tort law of premises
liability.144 These liability protections can be further augmented or
even assumed by the state or local government through contractbased management agreements, which can also define the scope of
recreational use. As noted above, property tax relief could provide
an added incentive.
Shoreline Protection Exactions. Another issue that has and will
increasingly generate conflict over public beach access is the pace
of erosion. Shoreline hardening is a prevalent response by
landowners, and the percentage of shoreline that has been hardened,
or is eligible to be hardened will only increase with time. Although
structures such as seawalls, revetments, and geotextile tubes may
successfully protect a structure for some period of time, shoreline
hardening can exacerbate erosion both in front of structures and on
adjacent properties. Over time, this can have the effect of
eliminating the entirety of the dry sand beach, and potentially
diminishing or eliminating even the wet sand beach, an area subject
to the protections of the public trust doctrine. 145 Compounded by
oftentimes intense political pressure, current legislation and rules
make it possible for beachfront landowners to obtain a permit to
armor their beachfront; even a permit that permits armoring in the
future. 146 Florida law currently addresses impediments to lateral
FLA. STAT. § 375.251.
See Carly Grimm et al., Feeling the Squeeze: The Troubled Future of Lateral
Beach Access In Florida, 35 ENVTL. & LAND USE L. SEC. REP. 1, 1, 1-23 (2014).
146 Thomas K. Ruppert, Eroding Prospects for Florida’s Beaches: Florida’s
Coastal Construction Control Line Program, 1 SEA GRANT L. AND POL’Y J. 65,
144
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beach access in coastal construction permitting and authorizes the
DEP to require access as a condition of the permit. 147 However, this
requirement applies only to the extent there is interference with
existing access at the time the permit is granted, and it is limited to
the width of the interference. 148
While permitting seawalls to protect property may make
sense to a property owner in the nearer-term, the long-term
prospects are less clear. Under current projections for sea-level rise,
many structures currently located on the oceanfront will likely be
undermined, and eventually destroyed or abandoned. The question
is when, not whether. The costs of a short-term strategy of shoreline
hardening (in the absence of beach nourishment) include the likely
eventual loss of dry sand beach and any customary use rights that
may have existed on that beach. Thus, it may be appropriate for the
legislature to revisit the relationship between coastal construction
permitting and public lateral beach access. Permits for seawalls and
other construction activities seaward of the Coastal Construction
Control Line could be conditioned on the provision of the public
right to access the privately-owned dry sand beach that lies in front
of the permitted construction, subject to reasonable local regulation.
Such a condition would certainly be considered an “exaction” under
federal and Florida law,149and would be subject to, and tested by the
United States Supreme Court’s essential nexus, 150 and rough
proportionality tests.151
Dune restoration is a preferred alternative to shoreline
hardening and some local governments have provided resources to
84–95(2009) (outlining problems with Florida’s coastal construction and
permitting programs).
147 FLA. STAT. §161.053(4)(e); see Grimm et al., supra note 132.
148 FLA. STAT. §161.053(4)(e).
149 See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
(Requiring landowner to grant an easement for lateral public access along
shoreline as a condition of granting a building permit constitutes an exaction
subject to the Takings Clause). Florida adopts federal law on the Takings Clause
in interpreting the analogous clause in its state Constitution. See St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So.3d 1220, 1222 (2011) rev’d on other
grounds 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
150 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. at 837.
151 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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beachfront property owners to restore dunes in order to relieve
pressure to install hardened shorelines in an emergency situation
where failing dunes would compromise structures, even though no
public recreational benefit is conferred (a requirement for federal
and state nourishment projects).152 In such cases, public assistance
with dune restoration on privately owned beaches could be
conditioned on recognition of customary use rights, or a property
interest in recreational access could be conveyed in recognition of
that assistance.
Right to Portage. Seawalls and other hardening techniques already
create barriers to even wet sand access along Florida’s beaches.
There are examples throughout the state where the Atlantic Ocean
or Gulf of Mexico consistently lap at the base of shoreline armoring,
at least for some portion of the tidal cycle. In such cases, the public
is deprived of access to even a wet sand beach to move from one
public beach to another, having to brave the shore break instead.
The legislature or the courts could recognize in the public a “right
to portage”: the right to limited trespass in order to go on, over, or
around an obstruction—in this case a seawall or other form of
armoring. There is both common law and statutory precedent in
other states for this right in streambeds, and the analogy should hold
for navigation along the foreshore, to the next available beach. 153

This dilemma is nowhere better observed than in the herculean efforts of
Flagler County to restore its beach-dune system, irrespective of ownership, in
the aftermath of Hurricanes Matthew and Irma, and described in the finding of
facts included in its post-HB 631 customary use ordinance. Flagler County
Board of County Commissioners, Public Hearing on Consideration of an
Ordinance Recognizing the Right of Customary Use of the Beach by the Public
(June 18, 2018). Indeed, Flagler Beach was forced to resort to local funding
precisely because it could not demonstrate to FEMA that there was adequate
beach access to allow for the expenditure of public funding.
153 Under the heading “Right to portage—establishment of portage route”,
MONT. CODE §23-2-311 (1) provides: “A member of the public making
recreational use of surface waters may, above the ordinary high-water mark,
portage around barriers in the least intrusive manner possible, avoiding damage
to the landowner's land and violation of the landowner's rights.”; see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 193 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The
privilege of navigation carries with it the ancillary privilege to enter on riparian
land to the extent that this is necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of
the principal privilege.”).
152
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Voluntary Approach to Advance Judicial Determination
That Includes Non-Governmental Parties.

Another issue related to customary use rights that legislative
reform could address are the obstacles to obtaining clarity about the
existence of customary use rights in a given location under the
common law, something the current statute partially sought to
address. This includes the difficulty that both members of the public
and local governments confront in seeking a judicial determination
of the scope of customary use rights. For members of the public,
the obstacle is the special injury rule. which is not addressed in the
statute. For local governments, the obstacle is the need to sue
relevant landowners in order to establish customary use, a problem
addressed by the creation of the new judicial process.
One option for reform that would alleviate the obstacles to
resolution of conflict would draw on the contours of the mandatory
judicial procedure outlined in Florida Statute §163.035. As is noted
above, amended legislation could incorporate a new voluntary
judicial process. Going beyond this, it could provide a mechanism
not just for local governments, but also for members of the public to
seek a determination of the existence of customary use rights. This
procedure could follow the general parameters of Florida Statute
§163.035(3)(b), but also establish a right of action for members of
the public. As long as the special injury rule established by the
Florida Supreme Court is not a constitutional requirement, but
merely a procedural rule, the legislature has the power to modify its
application in this context. This would level the playing field. As is
noted above, landowners have opportunities to seek a judicial
determination, but members of the public are constrained by the
special injury rule.
As a practical matter, such a provision is not likely to open
the floodgates to litigation. Preparation of the evidence needed to
support a claim of customary use is not a simple or necessarily
inexpensive undertaking. But motivated members of the public or
advocates for public beach access could seek to assert these rights
where conflict existed.
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VII. CONCLUSION
HB 631 converted local dustups between beachgoers and
beachfront landowners into a statewide sandstorm that pitted public
access to the dry sand beach against landowners’ private property
rights. Like detritus left after a storm, widespread but latent
confusion about the scope of and relationship between these
respective rights was exposed to all. Confused and exaggerated
narratives about the impacts of the new law added to the inherent
lack of clarity in the underlying common law, creating widespread
confusion and fueling ongoing conflict.
Despite the expressed goal of the sponsors of HB 631 to
resolve conflict, it remains unclear that they will succeed in this
ambition. The spate of lawsuits filed challenging Walton County’s
ordinance—both before and after the enactment of the new law—
have been dismissed only because the new law invalidated that
particular ordinance, or because the County had not yet successfully
adopted a new ordinance. But there is little reason to expect that
landowners will not pursue many of the same claims in new
litigation challenging any new ordinance. 154
Although the new law itself changed only the process
governmental entities must follow in order to adopt ordinances or
rules based on customary use, it arose out of a broader effort by
some landowners to restrict or eliminate customary use in Florida.
Thus, it was accurately perceived as a threat by members of the
public and beach access advocates. Moreover, it has shed light on a
significant and not easily resolved set of law and policy issues.
Customary use of Florida’s beaches has broad policy implications,
As is noted supra Part V.b., the statute is unclear on whether other claims can
be raised in the new judicial proceeding for declaring customary use; however, it
seems unlikely that landowners could raise many of the claims that were at the
heart of several of the dismissed cases, such as as-applied takings challenges, in
the new judicial processes. Thus, numerous individual lawsuits seem likely to
ensue in Walton County, at least. Only if the landowners are successful in
challenging the factual finding of customary use on their particular parcels does
it seem likely that they will drop their efforts. See, supra note 132 (discussing
Blessey case).
154
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with significant impact on recreational, property, dignity, economic,
and conservation values. Moreover, in an era of ongoing sea-level
rise, the pressures on our coastal resources and the conflicts among
these values will only increase.
For better or worse, this once arcane legal doctrine is now in
the spotlight in Florida, and the contours of its application around
Florida’s coastline will likely be shaped through a blend of
legislative and adjudicative processes. Law and policy makers face
considerable challenges in navigating these issues as they seek to
implement and build on the law in this area. This article is intended
as a resource for law and policy makers, judges, advocates, the
media, and the broader public. It is the authors’ hope that it will
provide useful information and legal analysis to assist those working
to resolve conflict, discern the state of the law today, and shape the
law and policy of beach access for the future.

